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 Introduction 
 
Ambassador Roger G. Harrison 
Editor-in-Chief
All of the articles submitted for this edition of 
our journal deal, in one way or another, with 
an essential change in the relative position of 
the United States in space, or – to put the 
matter rather more bluntly – the decline of 
U.S. space power and what to do about it.  I 
should add quickly that the decline is relative, 
and the base against which it’s measured is 
arbitrary. What is treated as a base was in fact 
a high point. It came in the 1990s, when the 
former Soviet space program was in disarray, 
the Europeans had not yet found their 
competitive edge and the prospect of China as 
a power space player was, at best, on the 
horizon, no bigger than a man’s hand. The 
U.S. was, for that decade, the unchallenged 
“shepherd of space” to use Everett Dolman’s 
evocative imagery. It was possible to imagine 
the world accepting the United States as a 
benevolent hegemon, setting rules to benefit 
all while remaining (as hegemonic powers 
generally do) somewhere outside the rules 
ourselves. At least this vision of “space 
control” was possible for U.S. observers to 
conjure. The rest of the world was simply 
annoyed. 
 
It isn’t necessarily “declinism” to point out 
that the vision has faded. In space, as in golf, 
it isn’t possible to win by preventing the other 
guy from doing better, and the circumstances 
that led to U.S. domination in the 1990’s 
began to change as the century turned. By 
then, the Russian Federation had regained its 
balanced, and reminded us that it was a near 
peer competitor with technology in some areas 
– notably rocket motors – that was still the 
best in the world. The European Arianne 
launcher had proven both reliable and 
scalable, and by 2000, Europe was a 
legitimate competitor, too. Commercial 
companies increased their share of space 
activity, and became supra-national, moving 
offshore to places like the Bahamas and 
Luxemburg. And here came China with both 
commercial programs and offensive ASAT 
programs that brought into serious question 
the central proposition of “space control” 
ideology, i.e. that the U.S. could control 
“access to space” and therefore space itself. 
That seems to have become a hollow – albeit 
in some circles still hallowed – claim. 
 
The Obama space policy and strategy are 
meant to deal with this new reality, and with 
the sobering prospect of budget shortfalls as 
far as the eye can see. Operating in space 
sucks resources at a frightening rate, a bad 
quality to have when the overall pie is 
shrinking. All of our authors seem to accept 
this new reality. They focus on its 
implications, which might be summed up in 
two thoughts: in the future, the United States 
will need to collaborate with other nations in 
space, and get more out of every dollar spent. 
The era of autarky is over. 
 
What should we do now? That is the subject 
all our authors address, and I shall leave them 
to speak for themselves. But there is one 
omission – not just from these articles, but 
from the national dialogue on security space in 
general – that I must point out. In all the 
discussion of vaguely defined rules of the 
road, and norms,  voluntary codes of conduct 
and “transparency and confidence building 
measures” there is a tendency to forget that 
space is subject to binding international law in 
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the form of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. 
That treaty speaks to issues that are no longer 
relevant: no one planned even in 1967 to 
station nuclear missiles on the moon. But also 
has pertinent things to say about consultation, 
and interference with the satellite operations 
of other states. It was meant to begin a process 
which – had it been taken seriously – might 
have allowed the evolution over time of a 
legal structure for space to deal with the 
problems of crowding and debris that we face 
now. It might even have been a framework for 
the discussion of curbing an arms race in 
space. None of this potential was realized, 
largely because both the Soviet Union and the 
United States preferred freedom of action to 
any legally binding regime in space. The 
Treaty was signed, ratified, and then largely 
ignored. 
 
I pointed this out recently to a room full of 
government space analysts, listing the sorts of 
things the OST addresses, sometimes in 
specific terms. Someone commented: “We 
could never get that sort of thing now.”    
Perhaps not. Luckily, we already have that 
sort of thing. It may be time to burrow in the 
archives, dust off the OST and ask ourselves 
whether its relevant to the concerns we now 
have in space – and if not, how it can be 
improved. 
 
RGH 
 
 
 
Coalitions in Space: 
Where Networks are Power 
 
James Clay Moltz 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
	  
Abstract: This study begins with the widely 
recognized problem of 21st century space 
vulnerabilities.  To address this challenge, it 
proposes the new concept of an “allied space 
network” as a possible means of both 
reducing risks and enhancing space power.  
Such a concept would move beyond realist, 
Cold War “balancing” in space, and instead 
would require new forms of technical and 
political cooperation in the military sector 
among participating states.  In thinking about 
future space security this study argues that 
trans-national networks and alliances offer 
considerable untapped potential, with possibly 
significant benefits particularly for the United 
States, which—unlike China and Russia—
already has established military alliances with 
a number of countries possessing or now 
developing advanced space capabilities. 
 
The challenge of achieving security in space 
has traditionally been viewed as purely a 
national security matter.  Until 1991, space 
activity was dominated by the hostile U.S.-
Soviet rivalry, which prevented active security 
cooperation in space beyond a series of 
restraint-based agreements.  Other space 
actors remained too weak to matter.  In terms 
of space operations, the two superpowers kept 
apart from one another except for occasional, 
publicity-serving civilian missions like the 
1975 Apollo-Soyuz flight.  What passed for 
cooperative space security arrangements 
during the Cold War emerged from a 
somewhat uncomfortable mutual tolerance of 
highly independent (and classified) U.S. and 
Soviet reconnaissance satellites and a series of 
largely bilateral (and a few multilateral) 
treaties that banned certain extremely harmful 
activities.  Fortunately, thanks to these limited 
mechanisms and policies of self-restraint, the 
Cold War in space ended without any direct 
attacks on either side’s satellites or other 
spacecraft. 
 
Yet, since the end of the Cold War, there has 
been very little further progress made toward 
strengthening international space security 
mechanisms, while there has been a spread of 
space technology and an expansion in the 
number of actors capable of doing harm in 
space. China broke an informal 22-year 
moratorium against kinetic-kill anti-satellite 
tests in January 2007 by destroying its own 
Fen-Yung 1C weather satellite at 525 miles 
up, creating more than 3,000 pieces of 
hazardous debris.  In response, India has 
vowed to develop an anti-satellite capability.   
In the face of the 2002 U.S. decision to 
withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty and the Navy’s February 2008 
destruction of an ailing satellite with a full 
tank of hydrazine (U.S. 193)—although at low 
altitude and with no long-lasting debris—
Russia stated that it would respond to any 
future U.S. action to weaponize space with its 
own program.  Among new actors, Iran 
successfully orbited a satellite in 2009, and 
North Korea has made two attempts to do so, 
raising concerns about these actors’ intentions 
in space.  Recent events have also stimulated 
interest in space among other national 
militaries, some of whom now speak of new 
“threats” to their space assets.  In this context, 
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action-reaction space arming is a widely 
feared trajectory. These dynamics pose a 
serious risk, particularly because there are a 
number of significant loopholes in the loose 
network of existing Cold War space security 
treaties and conventions, which currently 
allow a variety of space weapons to be tested 
and deployed in compliance with international 
law.  Moreover, the space environment lacks 
adequate verification mechanisms—such as 
pre-launch inspections, on-orbit spacecraft 
monitoring, and comprehensive space 
situational awareness—and is characterized by 
an increasing number of actors. 
 
In the face of this worrisome trend, one 
influential school of thought among U.S. 
space analysts sees strengthened national 
military measures—including ground-to-space 
weapons, air-to-space systems, and space-
based weapons—as the most desirable path 
for addressing this emerging space security 
dilemma.  Such perspectives prevailed among 
the senior ranks of Defense and State 
Department officials during the George W. 
Bush Administration and remain popular 
among conservative analysts.  This 
perspective warns of the risk of what the 2001 
Rumsfeld Commission report called a “space 
Pearl Harbor,” unless the United States 
deploys a range of defensive and offensive 
space weapons,1 even though many of these 
analysts recognize that such deployments 
might stimulate the same behavior among 
foreign space programs.  But they see few 
alternatives.  
 
A second school of thought argues that 
strengthened norms, rules, and international 
treaties are the best means of achieving space 
                                                
1 U.S. House Armed Services Committee, “Report of the 
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 
Management and Organization,” January 11, 2001, available 
online from the Air University’s National Space Studies 
Center website, at: http://space.au.af.mil/space_commission/ 
(accessed August 27, 2010).  
security and preventing a looming space arms 
race.  This school is found mostly among non-
governmental organizations, the arms control 
community, and some members of the Obama 
Administration, who have argued that the risks 
to space security are inherently international 
and that the main problem lies in the lack of 
clear “rules” for space. They point out that the 
use of space for weapons purposes will 
impinge on other actors as well, particularly if 
the attacking country creates orbital space 
debris that then becomes a risk to other space 
assets.  For this reason, the Obama 
Administration made significant changes in 
the U.S. National Space Policy released in 
June 2010,2 which now—in contrast to the 
Bush Administration’s policy—supports U.S. 
consideration of new, verifiable international 
agreements to improve space security. 
 
Almost two years into the Obama 
Administration, however, progress on the 
international front has been elusive.  Despite 
more accommodative policies undertaken 
since 2009 by both the United States and 
China at the U.N. Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva, there have been no 
formal international talks on space security, 
thanks to Pakistan’s opposition to forming an 
agenda that includes 
a Fissile Material 
Cut-Off Treaty.  This 
has prolonged a gap 
in such discussions 
that has lasted since 
the early 1990s.  In 
this context, treaty loopholes have festered 
since the end of the Cold War, while space 
technology has become more sophisticated 
and more dispersed during the same years.   
As a bipartisan U.S. study on security in the 
                                                
2 The White House, “National Space Policy of the United 
States of America,” June 28, 2010, available on the White 
House Office Science and Technology Policy website, at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_
policy_6-28-10.pdf (accessed August 27, 2010). 
“Space is in 
serious need 
of stronger 
international 
regimes.” 
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“global commons” issued in January 2010 
concludes, “Space is in serious need of 
stronger international regimes.”3   
Unfortunately, such agreements do not 
currently appear to be on the horizon, except 
for a voluntary European-sponsored Code of 
Conduct proposal. These trends foster 
uncertainty in regards to space and a tendency 
among national militaries to look to 
traditional, weapons-based solutions, whose 
testing, debris generation, and hair-trigger 
alert systems may put spacecraft at greater 
risk than even during the Cold War.  For these 
reasons, alternative approaches to reducing 
space vulnerability are needed—and soon. 
 
Notably, one option that has not been 
examined seriously enough in the current 
space debate is a possible middle-ground 
alternative for reducing spacecraft 
vulnerability: that of creating an allied space 
“network.”  Specifically, linking space 
capabilities first among formal U.S. military 
allies and then 
perhaps with 
other friendly 
nations could 
greatly reduce 
(if not 
eliminate) the 
risks of single-
point failures 
to important 
space systems 
and create a 
new form of space deterrence by raising the 
stakes for adversaries considering launching 
attacks on space assets. That is, by spreading 
capabilities among allies in space through the 
creation of interoperable, redundant networks 
of satellites, including in the military sector, 
                                                
3 Abraham M. Denmark and James Mulvenon, eds., 
“Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a 
Multipolar World,” Center for a New American Security, 
Washington, D.C., January 2010, p. 33.  
space-based partnerships could reduce costs, 
lessen vulnerability, and raise the challenges 
facing would-be attackers, thus obviating the 
need for expensive and destabilizing space-
based weapons.  This could provide 
considerable benefits in terms of U.S. and 
allied space security and improve chances for 
developing norms of peaceful international 
behavior.  
 
Yet despite these possible advantages of 
“allied” space thinking, no conceptual 
framework had been developed to date, and 
policy support has only very recently emerged 
in the 2010 National Space Policy and the 
2011 National Security Space Strategy.  
Operational cooperation is still very 
rudimentary, where it exists at all.  Indeed, as 
the former head of U.S. space operations in 
Afghanistan complained regarding the lack of 
integration of allied orbital assets, “U.S. space 
operators are not trained in how to be 
integrated into a coalition environment.”4 The 
reason stems from more than five decades of 
viewing space almost exclusively from a 
national security perspective, rather than an 
international security or coalition framework. 
This article argues, however, that changing 
conditions in space are making the traditional 
approach out-dated and increasingly 
ineffective.  Instead, an allied approach to 
space may represent the best short-term route 
to enhanced U.S. and allied space security, 
while potentially offering benefits to the 
global community of space users as well 
through its promotion of restraint-based 
norms.   
 
In order to address these issues, this article 
first analyzes the nature of space 
vulnerabilities and offers a 
                                                
4 USAF Lt. Col. Tom Single, quoted in Peter B. de Selding, 
“U.S. Officer: Secrecy Among Coalition Forces Hinders Use 
of Space Assets in Afghanistan,” Space News, May 10, 2010, 
p. A1. 
“Linking space 
capabilities first 
among formal 
U.S. military 
allies … could 
greatly reduce 
the risks of 
single point 
failures… 
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reconceptualization of the current security 
dilemma facing nations in space. It next 
considers the specific emerging threats to 21st 
century space security and discusses a 
possible framework for moving from national 
to multilateral means of combating them.  In 
doing so, it notes certain obstacles to be 
overcome as well.  Finally, the article sketches 
out in draft form what specific capabilities 
might be desirable and what foreign 
contributions the United States might enlist in 
creating an allied space network to increase 
the mutual security of its members.  
 
 
Reconceptualizing Space Security 
 
The issue of spacecraft vulnerability relates to 
certain basic facts of orbital physics combined 
with the relative transparency of space to 
radar, optical, and infrared observation.5   
These conditions make spacecraft liable to 
tracking even by amateur astronomers with 
only moderately sophisticated equipment, 
which is easily obtainable by any entry-level 
space power. While more complex guidance 
technology is required for actual attacks on 
space assets and a global network of radars is 
needed for conducting post-attack assessments 
of damage done, the ability of even 
moderately advanced space powers to conduct 
significant counterspace activities is not in 
question.  Thus far, only Russia, the United 
States, and China have tested kinetic 
capabilities, but a number of other countries 
(including Iran) have carried out lesser forms 
of electronic interference.  As a major space 
assessment conducted by NATO’s Joint Air 
Power Competence Centre in 2009 reported 
on some of the current vulnerabilities faced by 
the alliance in space:  
                                                
5 On these issues, see David Wright, Laura Grego, and 
Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A 
Reference Manual (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences, 2005). 
There are real and credible threats to 
Space systems. The ground systems 
are vulnerable to attack. There has 
been demonstrated use of GPS and 
SATCOM jammers.  Anti-satellite 
(ASAT) weapons have been 
demonstrated by the Soviet 
Union…and in January of 2007, 
China demonstrated its capability 
[…]. The potential exists for ground-
based laser weapons, electro-
magnetic pulse, and co-orbital ASAT 
weapons. Additionally, there are risks 
of collision from Space debris and 
impacts from solar events. There have 
been many instances of satellite 
telecommunications interference and 
piracy.6 
 
Space assets are also threatened by a field of 
orbital space debris that is steadily growing 
due to the increase in human space activity 
and the inability of space to “clean” itself 
quickly.  Depending on the altitude of the 
orbit, it can take years, decades, or centuries 
for pieces of space debris to deorbit.  In the 
meantime, these particles (even as small as 1 
centimeter) represent 18,000 miles-per-hour 
speeding bullets, which can destroy solar cells 
and cause often fatal damage to any spacecraft 
that are unfortunate enough to cross their 
paths.7  Today’s space environment is also 
characterized by an expansion in the number 
of civil, commercial, and military space 
actors, making international agreements more 
difficult than in the past. 
 
In the face of these risks and evidence of both 
expanding military space programs and 
weapons test programs in several countries, 
the response by many U.S. military leaders, 
elected officials, and even experts is still a 
traditional call for exclusively national action 
to “defend” U.S. assets in space.  To take just 
                                                
6 Ibid., p. 8. 
7 National Research Council, Orbital Debris: A Technical 
Assessment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 
1995), p. 12. 
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one U.S. example, Senator Jon Kyl (Rep., 
Arizona) stated after the 2007 Chinese ASAT 
test that the United States must deploy a fleet 
of space-based weapons to defend itself in 
space.8  He made no mention of the threat 
China posed to other allied nations or their 
possible contributions to the U.S. response. 
 
Historical conditions of anarchy in the 
international system have contributed to a 
tendency among leaders to conceive mainly of 
national responses to international threats.  
States are already organized for national 
defense, countries are jealous of spending 
scarce resources in potentially risky ventures 
with foreigners (even allies), and there are 
relatively low levels of trust regarding the 
reliability of international organizations.  But 
three factors have altered global dynamics in 
the last few decades, each of which has an 
important space component that supports the 
creation of an allied approach to space.  
 
First, the scale of multinational interactions to 
deal with shared problems is increasing due to 
the growing “finiteness” of the globe, as the 
world’s population continues to expand and as 
communications technologies become more 
intrusive and more widespread.  Indeed, the 
very nature of the problems countries are 
facing is changing as the Earth becomes 
“smaller”: almost all free land and airspace 
(up to 100 kilometers) have been claimed by 
nations (or otherwise allotted by international 
law), the sheer scale of industrial pollutants is 
beginning to have global effects, and such 
resources as clean air and water are becoming 
increasingly scarce.  Other problems, such as 
climate change, are becoming recognized as 
requiring an international response. Despite its 
comparative vastness, near-Earth space faces 
                                                
8 “China’s ASAT Test and American National Security,” 
remarks by Senator Kyl at the Heritage Foundation, January 
29, 2007, posted on the Globalsecurity.org website, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2007/space-
070129-kyl01.htm (accessed February 1, 2010). 
some of the same risks of growing human 
activity, particularly due to the finiteness of its 
main, usable resources (geostationary orbital 
slots, radio frequencies available for 
broadcasting, and safe access to low-Earth 
orbit).  All of these resources are becoming 
stressed by increasing human space activity.   
 
Second, economic globalization is an 
increasing fact of life.  Unlike during the Cold 
War, when the world was dominated by two, 
nearly self-sufficient blocs, changes in the 
international economic system (due to both 
political and technological factors) have made 
commercial exchange possible across almost 
all political boundaries, vastly increasing 
global trade.  Interdependent economic 
relationships are the rule in U.S. ties with our 
NATO and Asian allies and even, in some 
areas, with commercial partners like Russia 
and China. Similar to many industries, the 
commercial space industry has become truly 
international and now generates $161-billion 
in sales,9 making it a valuable resource for 
both national governments and the global 
economy more generally.    Technologies built 
in one country are frequently owned and 
marketed by another and are sold to clients in 
yet another.  Strong corporate alliances have 
already been formed in the space industry, for 
example, linking Russian rocket motors with 
U.S. launch vehicles (International Launch 
Services) and U.S. sub-orbital flight 
technology with British funding and 
marketing (Virgin Galactic).  With some 
offshore corporations like Intelsat, it is often 
difficult to tell which individual country a 
space enterprise actually “belongs” to.  
National militaries are also purchasing 
bandwidth on a large number of commercial 
satellites, causing the breadth of a country’s 
“critical assets” to expand.  Some of these 
assets are already shared with other nations, 
                                                
9 News Briefs, “Satellite Industry Revenues Topped $160B 
Globally in ’09,” Space News, June 14, 2010, p. 8.  
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although not in a joint operational sense.  Yet 
devoted military space cooperation between 
countries remains highly restricted, a 
characteristic that is out of step with these 
integrationist trends. 
 
Third, in military affairs,  
questions of international legitimacy are 
placing a growing emphasis on the need to 
conduct operations via coalitions.  Put simply, 
the unilateral use of force is seen as 
increasingly unacceptable within the 
international community.  Largely for this 
reason, the United States fought under a U.N. 
mandate in 1991 in the Gulf War against 
Iraq’s intervention into Kuwait and in Libya in 
2011; it fought under a NATO mandate in the 
Balkans and now under both UN and NATO 
mandates in Afghanistan; and it fought (less 
“legitimately” from the perspective of the rest 
of the world) with an ad hoc coalition of 
friends and allies in 2003 in Iraq.  Indeed, 
there is a growing literature on the need for 
some international approval even for 
humanitarian interventions by military forces 
in the modern era.10  Ironically, given these 
pressures to cooperate in military activity, 
space remains an outlier.  Unfortunately, the 
U.S. military has found by experience in 
Afghanistan that national barriers have 
impeded its effective use of space-derived 
data.  As one recent analysis of the problem of 
information-sharing in Afghanistan observes, 
“secrecy often keeps coalition team members 
from speaking about space-related topics with 
each other.”11   
 
These points raise a critical “process” 
question: How do countries come to realize 
that their security needs in a particular area of 
                                                
10 See, for example, Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms 
of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., 
The Culture of National Security and Identity in World 
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
11 De Selding, “U.S. Officer: Secrecy Among Coalition 
Forces Hinders Use of Space Assets in Afghanistan.” 
activity have crossed the line from national to 
international?  Realist political theory argues 
that security, by its very nature, is something 
that falls to states, as the essential building 
blocks of the international system and the 
repositories of sovereignty within it.  Yet 
space is an area specifically delineated as 
beyond national sovereignty by international 
law in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.  The 
failure of states to expand collective 
governance mechanisms in regard to space 
may be a factor of habit, perspective, and 
inertia, plus normal bureaucratic opposition to 
negotiations aimed at creating new, 
specialized institutions beyond national 
control.  
 
Recent threats to U.S. space assets have been 
viewed as national security threats because 
there is a long U.S. tradition of self-reliance in 
international relations and a perspective that 
successful collective action is rarely achieved. 
But, in space, all countries have an interest in 
protecting the environment from military 
threats and, in fact, from 
any obstacles to either 
free access or free 
passage.  These 
conditions create 
fundamental incentives 
for collective action that 
do not exist in other 
areas of international 
relations. Ironically, one of the primary 
obstacles to enhanced collective action to 
protect space security may be the thinking of 
the actors themselves, which still remains 
largely rooted in the unilateral traditions of 
security provision from past security 
frameworks. But, as Robert Keohane argues, 
“To pursue self-interest does not require 
maximizing freedom of action. On the 
contrary, intelligent and farsighted leaders 
understand that attainment of their objectives 
“To pursue self-
interest does not 
require 
maximizing 
freedom of 
action.”  
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may depend on their commitment to 
institutions that make cooperation possible.”12  
Working with allies, therefore, may represent 
the best security solution available at this 
point in space history, and perhaps may serve 
as a bridge to broader forms of international 
cooperation in the future.  Alliance-based 
efforts could mitigate a variety of emerging 
space-related security concerns.  The prior 
existence of allied military institutions—
particularly established patterns of cost-
sharing, integration, joint operations, and joint 
training—both in the case of NATO and in 
various bilateral arrangements with Asian 
countries (such as Australia, Japan, and South 
Korea) should reduce typical collective action 
problems in forming such new mechanisms 
for space.   
 
 
Roots of a Multinational Approach to 
Space Security 
 
Notably, there is a long history of attempted 
transnational approaches to space security.  
Space activity actually began in the context of 
a major multilateral scientific initiative known 
as the International Geo-Physical Year (IGY).  
Both the Soviet Union and the United States 
announced plans to orbit satellites as part of 
their contributions to the IGY—and the 
Soviets got there first.  However, any hope of 
using international science cooperation to 
promote international security in space soon 
fell to the wayside, given the context of the 
hostile competition between the Soviet Union 
and the United States.   
 
Yet multilateralism in space did not die 
entirely.  Two critical UN resolutions passed 
in 1963 and the ratification of the Partial Test 
Ban Treaty helped safeguard safe access to 
                                                
12 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 259. 
space through collective means in the face of 
threats of territorial claims, damage caused by 
ongoing nuclear tests in orbit, and disputes 
over future liability questions.  As mentioned 
above, the further codification of space rules 
in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty helped expand 
the notion of space as an extra-territorial realm 
with a range of collective restrictions on 
military activities, particularly on the Moon 
and celestial bodies.  The bilateral ABM 
Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitations 
Talks Interim Agreement (SALT I) in 1972 
prohibited space-based missile defenses and 
interference with national technical means of 
verification (i.e., satellites).  The 1972 
Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects further 
expanded the norm of mutual restraint in 
space and provided evidence of the 
willingness of even the world’s most powerful 
militaries to cede areas of space sovereignty to 
collective agreements in order to help ensure 
safe and reliable access. As Larry Wortzel 
observes, “The U.S. and the Soviet Union 
seemed to realize that it is potentially 
destabilizing to define the upper limits of 
sovereignty.  Thus, neither country interfered 
with the other’s free passage in space.  Also, 
they agreed that the ability to conduct strategic 
verification from space stabilized the nuclear 
balance.”13  Although, joint military activities 
were not possible in the poisoned political 
environment of the Cold War, important 
norms of space restraint did emerge between 
the two superpowers despite their political 
tensions.  
 
In the early 1990s, the two formerly most 
hostile enemies took unprecedented steps after 
the Soviet break-up in civilian space 
cooperation, joining with Canada, Japan, and 
the countries of the European Space Agency 
                                                
13 Colonel (U.S. Army, ret.) Larry M. Wortzel, “The Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army and Space Warfare,” Astropolitics, 
Vol. 6, No. 2 (May-August 2008), p. 128. 
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in the construction of the International Space 
Station (ISS). This $100 billion civilian project 
is still ongoing and has linked the human 
spaceflight programs of all major space-faring 
countries, except China and India.  Despite 
occasional glitches, it has worked remarkably 
well and has served U.S. interests. The U.S. 
commercial sector has become similarly 
international, including significant 
cooperation with Russia in the space launch 
field.  But little such effort has been made to 
promote allied or other transnational space 
security engagement, particularly in 
operational programs. 
 
Since the Soviet break-up and the rise of U.S. 
skepticism of the need for further space arms 
control, bilateral space security norms from 
the Cold War have failed to spread adequately 
among new space-faring nations, such as 
China.  As Wortzel points out, in contrast to 
the history of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations in 
regard to space, “No such dialogue has taken 
place with China.”14  Wortzel blames 
opponents from the People’s Liberation Army 
for blocking initial U.S. overtures late in the 
Bush Administration.  Others blame the 
United States for rejecting talks on space 
security from 1998 to 2009 at the U.N. 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.  Put 
simply, the United States did not perceive a 
demand for such a dialogue until China’s 
ASAT test in 2007.  This neglect now seems 
short-sighted. What is more surprising is that, 
until very recently, there has been little 
engagement between the United States and its 
allies in space security matters.  Indeed, with 
the exception of some limited studies in the 
NATO context, no overarching framework for 
allied space cooperation to enhance space 
security has emerged in the post-Cold War 
period.  
 
                                                
14 Wortzel, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and 
Space Warfare,” p. 128. 
As noted in the introduction, the existing 
framework for space security remains 
problematic, and there are few new initiatives 
to address these gaps. The one exception to 
the current stalemate occurred in December 
2007, when the countries of the United 
Nations agreed to adopt a voluntary set of 
U.S.-supported debris mitigation guidelines, 
providing a limited set of norms.  But the 
effort still fell far short of halting non-WMD 
weapons testing or deployment in space, even 
kinetic-kill tests, allowing such activities as 
long as the debris was short lived.  It also 
created no international system for space 
situational awareness or enforcement, relying 
only on national means.  As for treaties, the 
only proposal on the international agenda is 
the Russo-Chinese Prevention of the 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty 
(PPWT)—a limited effort focused only on 
banning space-based weapons.  However, the 
proposal exempts testing and development of 
other space weapons, such systems as China’s 
ground-based ASAT, thus severely diluting 
the utility of such an agreement.  The more 
limited, European-sponsored Code of Conduct 
has been informally available for comment 
since December 2008, but—even if agreed 
to—will offer only partial effectiveness 
toward increasing space security given its 
voluntary status and its lack of specific 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.15  
As of late March 2011, the United States had 
only announced its support for the “process” 
of the code’s elaboration, not for the 
document itself.  Russian and China have 
flatly opposed the effort.  Under these 
conditions, it is not yet possible to make the 
jump to a fully inclusive international space 
security arrangement or treaty.  In the 
meantime, the United States and its allies 
                                                
15 European Union, Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space 
Activities, December 17, 2008, available on the Stimson 
Center website at: 
http://www.stimson.org/space/pdf/EU_Code_of_Conduct.pdf 
(accessed August 27, 2010). 
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might be well served to start building their 
own cooperative security network as a critical 
first step.  Such a move would enhance U.S. 
and allied space security and perhaps serve as 
a model that can be expanded upon later, if 
other actors see benefits in joining the system 
(and the allies agree to such engagement).  
 
To date, the concept of multinational space 
cooperation has been perhaps best exemplified 
in the European Space Agency’s (ESA’s) civil 
space programs, which are collectively 
organized, funded, and implemented.  The ISS 
case is another example of successful civilian 
cooperation, bringing together the United 
States with ESA countries and Russia.  Of 
course, other countries have cooperated in 
joint scientific and commercial projects as 
well, but almost none in the security realm. 
Even in Europe, space security cooperation—
particularly in operational terms—has been 
very limited.  Similarly, a review of the recent 
U.S. literature on space security reveals how 
little attention has been paid to concepts of 
possible military alliance-building for space.  
With a few exceptions, the topic has been 
largely ignored, due to the enduring 
propensity of most authors to view space 
security from a purely nationalistic lens.  This 
is even true within the academic community.  
A few examples are worth examining to 
highlight this point. 
 
Everett C. Dolman’s well-known book 
Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the 
Space Age (Cass, 2002) argues that a single, 
major power (presumably, either the United 
States or China) will eventually exercise 
“space dominance” over other actors.  
Because of this assumption, he fails to 
consider seriously the possible role of alliance 
contributions to such strategies, arguing that 
all other powers will simply be forced to 
comply with the rules established by the 
hegemon, rather than themselves establishing 
a multilateral structure.  The concept that an 
alliance of countries might dominate 
collectively is not considered, although 
Dolman concedes that sustaining such a 
offensive-oriented, state-centric approach to 
achieving space security is “in the long 
term…counterproductive and detrimental.”16  
 
Similarly, Benjamin S. Lambeth’s otherwise 
very thorough coverage of space challenges 
Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next 
Steps in the Military Uses of Space (RAND, 
2003) fails to refer to the possible contribution 
of allies at all, assuming perhaps that U.S. 
allies have no space assets worth considering.  
U.S. Navy Commander John J. Klein’s book 
Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and 
Policy (Routledge, 2006) mentions allies on a 
handful of occasions but only in a very 
theoretical context, such as the need to rally 
support from allies in case of facing a superior 
space power.  Yet there is no discussion of 
what such countries might contribute in an 
operational sense in a conflict, much less 
consideration of the peacetime creation of a 
space-based alliance as part of a strategy of 
orbital deterrence. Notably, the Bush 
Administration’s 2006 National Space Policy 
does not mention U.S. allies in the section on 
“National Security Space Guidelines,” except 
in a vague manner as possible recipients of 
U.S. space-derived intelligence data under 
certain, limited circumstances.17   
 
Among authors more supportive of 
international space cooperation, Joan Johnson-
Freese’s book Space as a Strategic Asset 
(Columbia University Press, 2007) discusses 
the failure of NATO to come up with a unified 
space policy, in part due to the fact that “to 
date, most European military space programs 
                                                
16 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in 
the Space Age (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 2. 
17 The White House, “U.S. National Space Policy,” August 
31, 2006, posted on the website of the Federation of American 
Scientists, at: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/space.pdf 
(accessed August 27, 2010).   
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have been strictly national programs.”18  She 
contrasts this failure with their highly 
integrated cooperation in the civil space field.  
Nevertheless, she remains skeptical of the 
ability of U.S. NATO allies to make 
significant contributions to U.S. space 
security, except in a supporting role.  In other 
areas of space activity, however, Johnson-
Freese cautions that unduly restrictive U.S. 
export controls could stimulate civil and 
commercial space partnerships among China, 
Russia, and the countries of the European 
Space Agency (including many leading 
NATO members).   
 
USAF Lt. Col. (ret.) Forrest E. Morgan’s 
highly informative report Deterrence and 
First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary 
Assessment (RAND, 2010) makes the case 
that the United States cannot expect to address 
its space vulnerabilities simply through threats 
of national retaliation, which are unlikely to 
be effective or convincing in space.  Instead, 
Morgan argues for a mixed strategy of 
“threatening a range of punitive responses in 
multiple domains while at the same time 
reducing the benefits of enemy attacks by 
improving defenses, dispersing and concealing 
space capabilities, and demonstrating the 
ability to rapidly replenish whatever losses are 
sustained.”19  Somewhat surprisingly, 
however, Morgan’s prescriptions fail to 
mention the potential role of allies in carrying 
out such a strategy, perhaps because of the 
difficulties of overcoming traditional secrecy 
concerns.   
 
Within the literature, therefore, there are 
relatively few supporters of new allied space 
structures.  One of the few exceptions is 
Steven Lambakis’s book On the Edge of 
                                                
18 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 187. 
19 Forrest E. Morgan, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in 
Space: A Preliminary Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2010), p. 6. 
Earth: The Future of American Space Power 
(University of Kentucky, 2001).  Although 
Lambakis portrays space largely within a 
realist-driven framework of military struggle, 
he does consider the possible contribution of 
allies, noting “The United States will need the 
political support of its allies and friends as 
well as their involvement in military space 
activities, to include economic contribution 
through collaboration in system development 
and participation in operations.”20  He 
concludes by arguing in regard at least to 
ground stations and surveillance, there are 
“undoubtedly several contributions U.S. allies 
can make in these areas.”21  A more recent 
study by USAF Lt. Col. Michael P. Gleason 
goes further in spelling out why the specific 
political-economic situation of the second 
decade of the twenty-first century is ripe for 
such efforts, arguing, “With U.S. budgets 
constrained and U.S. security space programs 
lagging, now is the time to partner with the 
EU [European Union] in security space.”22  
USAF Lt. Col. (ret.) Peter Hays makes the 
supporting argument that “State-of-the-art 
constellations…can be augmented with state-
of-the-world capabilities to make these 
capabilities more resilient.”23  
 
With some exceptions, this review of some of 
the leading recent studies of space security 
shows that there has been inadequate attention 
paid to the prospects of truly allied strategies 
to accomplish shared goals of space threat 
reduction, deterrence, and defense.  Part of the 
                                                
20 Steven Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth: The Future of 
American Space Power (Lexington, KY: The University Press 
of Kentucky, 2001), p. 285. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Lt. Col. (USAF) Michael P. Gleason, “Shaping the Future 
with a New Space Power: Now is the Time,” High Frontier, 
Vol. 6, No. 2 (February 2010), p. 43.  
23 Peter L. Hays, “An Agile and Adaptive Enterprise: 
Enhancing National Security Space by Improving 
Management Structures and Leveraging Commercial and 
International Partners,” Astropolitics, Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (May-
December 2010), p. 163. 
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reason, perhaps, is the general lack of 
familiarity among U.S. space experts with the 
emerging capabilities of allied space actors.  
Given the highly classified world of space 
operations, many military and governmental 
analysts simply tend to focus on keeping track 
of U.S. capabilities and problems.  Similarly, 
existing U.S. export control restrictions make 
some forms of cooperation simply impossible, 
depending on the level of technology 
exchange involved.  Congress too has been 
leery of funding any form of cooperation that 
might seem like “foreign aid” in space, and 
has only grudgingly gone along with civil 
spaceflight purchases from Russia, despite the 
coming break in U.S. capabilities to deliver 
astronauts to the ISS.   
 
But the United States has global military 
responsibilities and depends heavily on its 
space capabilities to fulfill them. It also works 
closely with allies on the ground, at sea, and in 
the air, such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Libya. Yet as the 2009 NATO assessment 
laments about the state of members’ space 
assets: “[our] essential capabilities are at risk 
because we simply have not thought through 
the Alliance’s Space needs, developed any 
strategy, considered the consequences of no 
action, or prepared any risk mitigation 
strategies.”24 As a result, the study complains, 
“The current approach to Space is piecemeal, 
a bottom-up effort lacking overarching 
structure or direction.”25   
 
The 2011 National Security Space Strategy 
marked a major turning point in official U.S. 
thinking about allied space activity when it 
recognized that in an “increasingly congested, 
contested, and competitive” environment, the 
United States faced new “opportunities for 
                                                
24 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, “NATO Space 
Operations Assessment,” Kalkar, Germany, January 2009, p. 
7.  
25 Ibid., p. 1 
leadership and partnership.”26  Although the 
NSSS provided few specifics, it pledged that: 
“With our allies, we will explore the 
development of combined space doctrine with 
principles, goals, and objectives that, in 
particular, endorse and enable the 
collaborative sharing of space capabilities in 
crisis and conflict.”27  Implementation, 
however, remains in its initial stages only. 
 
With these challenges and opportunities in 
mind, it is now worth considering what 
specific advantages might accrue to U.S. 
space security from a closer partnership with 
allies in this regard, as well as how such a new 
military space partnership might actually be 
formed.  
 
 
 
 
Getting from Here to There: Building a 
Layered Framework for Policing Space 
 
Despite the risks facing U.S. space assets, the 
challenges for an adversary seeking to carry 
out a sustained campaign against space assets 
in multiple orbits in a non-cooperative context 
are still difficult.  Redundancy and 
reconstitution strategies could potentially be 
very effective against limited attacks.  To the 
extent that a group of allied spacefaring 
countries could create a network of interactive 
satellites and develop policies for mutual 
support in a time of crisis, such efforts could 
greatly reduce even the risk of individual 
attacks on satellites, since any gaps could be 
quickly filled in and therefore rendered 
pointless.  However, the United States and its 
allies are a long way from establishing this 
capability.  This raises two related questions: 
                                                
26 U.S. Department of Defense and the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, “National Security Space Strategy 
(Unclassified Summary),” January 2011, p. i. 
27 Ibid., p. 9. 
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what countries should be involved and what 
capabilities should be linked? 
 
While the U.S. military has so far failed to 
form true space partnerships with other 
countries, there has been a rapid expansion in 
the space capabilities of allied militaries in the 
past 15 years.  France has led the way in 
launch capabilities and Earth imaging 
(including for military purposes), but an 
additional five NATO countries—Canada, 
Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, and the United 
Kingdom—operate more than 10 satellites 
apiece for remote-sensing, communications, 
and scientific purposes.  Meanwhile, Spain, 
the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and 
Turkey each operate more than five satellites 
and associated ground stations.28  Although the 
vast majority are civilian satellites, their 
militaries are becoming steadily more 
involved in space. Among U.S. allies in Asia, 
Japan is a major spacefaring country with 
extensive human spaceflight and space science 
experience, as well as valuable technology in 
its H-II Transfer Vehicle (used for the 
International Space Station), launchers, and 
communications satellites. In fact, a recent 
statement issued on the 50th anniversary of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance by U.S. Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy 
specifically highlighted “the need to 
strengthen our cooperation under the alliance 
to promote the security of the global 
commons, including space and cyberspace.”29  
In addition, South Korea has increasing 
experience in reconnaissance, 
communications, and satellite manufacturing, 
while moving steadily toward space-launch 
capability.  Australia, Taiwan, and Thailand 
also have significant satellite operations 
                                                
28 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, “NATO Space 
Operations Assessment,” Figure 5: Nations Operating 
Satellites, p. 8.  
29 Michele Flournoy, “Point of View: U.S.-Japan alliance a 
cornerstone in a complex world,” Asahi Shimbun, July 16, 
2010. 
experience.  Finally, India is a highly capable 
space power as well, with launch systems to 
both low-Earth and geostationary orbits, 
reconnaissance assets, extensive space 
applications experience, and an expanding 
pool of skilled personnel.   This broad-based 
collection of space capabilities represents a 
major, untapped U.S. resource for dealing 
with its space vulnerabilities.  Indeed, it is fair 
to say that the United States has an 
“asymmetric advantage” over countries like 
China and Russia in having a host of 
significant spacefaring countries that are also 
military allies or friends.  Yet almost nothing 
has been done to use this advantage to shape 
the emerging space environment to benefit the 
United States and its partners, or to set an 
example for other countries worldwide in 
responsible space behavior.  Instead, as the 
2009 NATO space assessment describes, 
current regulations make space information 
and operations “‘too sensitive’ to discuss 
outside of National boundaries.”30   
 
But a study of NATO’s emerging space needs 
by USAF Major Thomas Single argues, “The 
emphasis must be on moving from a ‘need to 
know’ to a ‘need to share’.”31  Time also may 
be of the essence. As 
Lt. Col. Gleason points 
out, the European 
Union—given its 
growing range of space 
assets—is “perfectly 
willing to develop its 
dual-use security space 
capabilities, 
architectures, and institutional structures 
without US involvement.”32  The same might 
                                                
30 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, “NATO Space 
Operations Assessment,” Kalkar, Germany, January 2009, p. 
7.  
31 Thomas Single, “Considerations for a NATO Space 
Policy,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives, No. 
12, September 2008, p. 4. 
32 Gleason, “Shaping the Future,” p. 44. 
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be said of Japanese and South Korean 
capabilities in a few more years, without U.S. 
input.  Thus, a priority should be placed on 
building partnerships from the ground up as 
these systems evolve in order to, in Gleason’s 
terms, influence the development of 
capabilities “in ways which will benefit 
American national security for decades into 
the future.”33 
 
While U.S. national security space programs 
need to be protected in this process, it is also 
worth observing that the United States has 
already shared sensitive data successfully with 
a range of countries in the nuclear sector, 
including with the United Kingdom and 
France.  Moreover, officials and military 
officers from Germany and Australia have 
long cooperated with the United States on 
sensitive matters related to national defense 
including, in Australia’s case, operating 
extremely sensitive facilities related to space-
derived intelligence and early-warning 
information.  Thus, the view of space 
operations as “too sensitive” to share may be 
an out-dated perspective, particularly as risks 
to assets rise and demands for cooperation 
increase.  Under these conditions, a range of 
possible means of reducing threats to U.S. and 
allied systems might emerge through 
cooperation, with additional benefits in 
providing the framework for deterring harmful 
acts and perhaps building bridges with other 
responsible spacefaring nations. Such efforts 
would require amendment of existing and 
highly protective U.S. International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations (ITAR).  But many officials 
and military leaders have been calling for 
exactly such reforms for years.  Assuming that 
these controls could be modified to allow 
greater cooperation, what areas might be most 
fruitful for such allied networking?   
 
                                                
33 Ibid., p. 43. 
First, the United States and its allies need to 
know where spacecraft are in orbit and where 
threats from orbital debris (whether intentional 
or not) might arise.  This requires keeping 
track of both active and inactive spacecraft 
still in orbit. Today, the U.S. military operates 
the Space Surveillance Network, which has 
the world’s most extensive catalogue of space 
objects.  Since the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos 
collision, the U.S. Air Force has begun to do 
more complete conjunction analysis and to 
share this information with other space users.  
At the same time, U.S. allies could 
supplement this effort by providing 
information from their radar systems.  In 
particular, U.S. NATO allies operate a number 
of radars and telescopes at multiple sites in 
Europe that could be used to bolster joint 
capabilities.34  Japan is also beginning research 
on space-based surveillance via satellite that 
could in the future yield additional useful data, 
particularly on microsatellites and their 
activities.  Improved space situational 
awareness (SSA) through allied cooperation 
may be critical to determining interference 
with spacecraft and determining fault, as well 
as building international coalitions to establish 
the “ground truth” necessary for levying  fines 
on space users, depriving perpetrators of 
access to space business, stripping them of 
rights to geostationary slots, or cutting-off 
frequency allocations for broadcasting 
satellites.  Accordingly, the 2010 U.S. 
National Space Policy calls upon the U.S. 
government to “Enhance capabilities and 
techniques, in cooperation with civil, 
commercial, and foreign partners to identify, 
locate, and attribute sources of radio 
frequency interference, and take necessary 
measures to sustain the radiofrequency 
environment in which critical U.S. space 
                                                
34 Xavier Pasco, “Toward a Future European Space 
Surveillance System: Developing a Collaborative Model for 
the World,” in Logsdon, Moltz, and Hinds, eds., Collective 
Security in Space European Perspectives. 
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systems operate.”35  Similar techniques need to 
be developed against laser, microwave, and 
other hostile technologies. 
 
A second priority area after SSA is ensuring 
the continuation of service for global 
positioning, navigation, and timing networks 
like the U.S. Global Positioning System 
(GPS).  The development of this satellite 
constellation has provided tremendous 
benefits to the U.S. military in being able to 
improve accuracy and reduce collateral 
damage and deaths with its weaponry, as well 
as assisting in a range of other military 
functions.  Europe’s planned Galileo system, 
Japan’s Quasi-Zenith system, and India’s 
future GAGAN system could provide 
important supplemental data should the GPS 
system ever be threatened by hostile actions in 
space.  By ensuring compatibility among these 
networks and arranging for quick replacement 
responsibility within the constellation in case 
of attack, the United States and its friends and 
allies could guarantee that GPS information 
would be available in any future crisis. 
 
A third critical area is reconnaissance.  
Currently, the United States relies on a 
relatively small number of large, highly 
expensive satellites in low-Earth orbit to 
provide high-resolution images on critical 
adversaries or problem areas.  Due to the risk 
of their loss, the rising costs of such 
spacecraft, and the need for more data, the 
U.S. military has already begun contracting 
with such commercial firms as DigitalGlobe 
and GeoEye to provide imagery that, while 
not as precise, is good enough in many 
instances.  Working with allies would provide 
yet another source of imagery in case of the 
loss of any U.S. military or commercial 
satellite in a crisis.  These systems might 
include Japan’s Information Gathering 
                                                
35 The White House, “National Space Policy of the United 
States of America,” June 28, 2010, p. 9. 
Satellites, Germany SAR-Lupe system, 
France’s Helios (and future Pleiades), and 
Italy’s Cosmo-Skymed.36  South Korea also 
operates imagery satellites, as does the United 
Kingdom.  Unfortunately, even in conflict 
zones such as Afghanistan, there has been 
little cooperation to date due to the lack of 
established mechanisms and strong 
countervailing traditions of space secrecy.37  
Such problems could be overcome through 
establishing protocols for exchanges of 
information as well as possible designation of 
certain satellites as “allied,” whether under 
NATO auspices or a larger space cooperation 
entity that would include non-NATO U.S. 
allies as well. These capabilities would ideally 
evolve over time toward development of a 
common software interface, if not certain 
shared hardware to promote interoperability 
and replacements.  Joint training of officers 
could support such a system, thus developing 
core expertise across the alliance that would 
serve to expand effective use of space imagery 
on the battlefield and in peacetime.  
Surprisingly, excluding U.S. military space 
personnel (which numbered approximately 
100), only one non-U.S. space professional 
was serving in the Middle East Area of 
Operation as of 2009.38  Clearly, this is far 
from adequate.  
 
As a fourth priority, communications and 
early-warning satellites located in 
geostationary orbit should be secured.  
Fortunately, this job is the easiest given the 
difficult of carrying out an undetected attack 
on an object at an altitude of 22,300 miles.  
Still, the United States and its allies should 
first develop mechanisms for replacing critical 
                                                
36 Adam Keith, “Diversifying Capabilities for Image 
Intelligence,” Space News, July 19, 2010, p. 15. 
37 De Selding, “U.S. Officer: Secrecy Among Coalition 
Forces Hinders Use of Space Assets in Afghanistan.” 
38 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, “NATO Space 
Operations Assessment,” Table 3: Current Space Operations 
Personnel, p. 29. 
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functions in case of problems.  They should 
also begin outreach with other parties—
including China, which is not covered by 
U.S.-Russian non-interference pledges—to 
respect the inviolability of early-warning 
satellites, in particular, given their role in 
promoting nuclear stability.  Clearly, China 
should understand that any attack on an early-
warning satellite could be legitimately 
mistaken as part of the first stage in a major 
nuclear attack and would trigger extreme 
means of defense by the United States and its 
allies. 
 
A fifth area for allied cooperation is that of 
developing avoidance mechanisms—in other 
words, decoys and quick replacement 
capabilities to protect satellites.  This is better 
done in concert with multiple parties than 
unilaterally due to the advantages of having 
multiple platforms available and multiple 
launch sites.  This could include developing 
standard, interoperable reconnaissance 
satellites and other critical spacecraft and 
locating them in different allied launch sites 
around the world. In a future world of 
cubesats, this kind of integration may become 
easier (and more affordable) than it is 
currently. Allies could also fly decoy satellites 
in their constellations to increase the burden of 
numbers on potential attackers, or collectively 
develop and deploy spoofing systems or chaff-
releasing pods to foil enemy radar seekers. 
 
Sixth, in case a satellite or spacecraft engaged 
in harmful activity would need to be stopped 
by the collective forces of a cooperating group 
of major space-faring powers,   having the 
collective ability to deter, disable, and, if 
necessary, to destroy hostile space assets may 
be necessary in extreme circumstances.  These 
could include existing ballistic missile defense 
assets (such as the U.S., Japanese, and South 
Korean Aegis systems and Ground-Based 
Interceptors in the United States, future 
MEADS-type interceptors in NATO, and 
perhaps other assets). Their use against a 
rogue actor would have to be coordinated by a 
joint space council of the allied powers.  Such 
moves have critics and would need to be 
considered carefully for their possible effects 
on space security more generally. That is, 
while there is a temptation to take the next 
step to allied deployment of orbital space 
weapons in order to supplement new 
redundancy capabilities and currently limited 
ground- or sea-based counterspace weapons, 
further steps may be unwise, at least absent 
new threats.  Lt. Col. (ret.) Morgan argues in 
response to calls in some quarters supporting 
deployment of space weapons and policies of 
attempted space dominance, “While such 
arguments resonate with those acculturated in 
the U.S. military tradition, it is hard to 
conceive how placing counterspace weapons 
in orbit would do anything to defend U.S. 
satellites from enemy ground-based weapons 
or, for that matter, other weapons in space.”39  
Morgan observes that such weapons 
themselves would be in fixed orbits and 
vulnerable to attack.  He adds: “Taking this 
step may also encourage other spacefaring 
nations to follow suit, ultimately resulting in a 
dangerously unstable strategic environment 
that would generate severe ‘use-or-lose’ 
pressures.”40 
 
Finally, any allied approach to space security 
would likely have to create a functioning 
transnational, operational body to manage 
share systems, provide joint training, and 
handle finances.  The 2009 NATO assessment 
concludes by calling for a Space Office at 
NATO headquarters as well as a NATO Space 
Operations Coordination Centre.41  But, given 
the desirability of involving allies from Asia, a 
broader center seems to be more prudent.  
                                                
39 Morgan, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space, pp. 
33-4. 
40 Ibid., p. 34. 
41 Ibid., p. 46. 
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Access to the operations center would have to 
be strictly controlled through both a 
classification system and personnel reliability 
program.  As noted, such efforts have 
succeeded in the past at sensitive NATO 
nuclear locations and at space sites in 
Australia.  The program would have to start 
small and perhaps with a limited numbers of 
countries most heavily involved in space 
already: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Japan, and 
South Korea. 
 
From this author’s informal discussions, 
support for such a cooperative space network 
seems to exist already among a number of 
NATO members and in Australia, Japan, and 
South Korea.  The U.S.-Australian 
announcement of planned SSA cooperation in 
the fall of 2010 and joint funding of the 
Wideband Global Satcom system mark 
important first steps toward operational 
integration.  Notably, these trends are 
consistent with the 2010 U.S. National Space 
Policy’s call for new types of cooperation at 
the international level, including in the area of 
national security space.  Indeed, the section on 
“National Security Space Guidelines” goes 
even further in spelling this out: “Options for 
mission assurance may include rapid 
restoration of space assets and leveraging 
allied, foreign, and/or commercial space and 
nonspace capabilities to perform the 
mission.”42  These guidelines point to 
additional useful paths forward.  
 
A supporting mechanism to begin building the 
model outward to friends and other 
responsible spacefaring nations—such as 
India, Israel, and others—might be patterned 
on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  
This concept emerged in 2003 as a means of 
filling gaps in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) for stopping the illicit transit of 
                                                
42 Ibid., p. 13. 
weapons of mass destruction and related 
technologies, materials, and delivery systems.  
This Bush-Administration-inspired “coalition 
of the willing” began to organize voluntary 
national military and law enforcement efforts 
into a process that would allow inspection and 
seizure of crews and contraband.  Such a 
model may be useful for space as well. 
Another supporting concept for collective 
space security might be the U.S. Navy’s idea 
of creating a large coalition of international 
assets to engage in collective maritime 
security: the 1,000-ship navy.43  As Admiral 
Mike Mullen describes the maritime model, 
this would be a “global maritime partnership 
that united maritime forces, port operators, 
commercial shippers, and international, 
governmental and nongovernmental agencies 
to address mutual concerns.”44  Mullen views 
it as a voluntary network of maritime powers 
“interested in using the power of the see to 
united, rather than to divide.”45  For space, this 
could include commercial and scientific 
spacecraft as well and would thus involve 
many more players—functioning like an 
active “neighborhood watch” committee.  The 
practical experience of international efforts to 
combat piracy off of the Horn of Africa may 
provide a positive lesson in regard to the 
future “policing” of space. 
 
Despite the advantages of creating such an 
allied network for space, it must be admitted 
that a number of current obstacles exist to 
such efforts.  Traditional U.S. thinking about 
U.S. exceptionalism in space would have to be 
revised and a more egalitarian view of alliance 
partners adopted.  The U.S. State, Defense, 
and Commerce Departments would need to 
engage in ITAR reform and craft new 
military-to-military agreements (of the type 
                                                
43 Adm. Mike Mullen, “Commentary: We Can’t Do It Alone,” 
Honolulu Advertiser, October 29, 2006. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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the U.S. has with Australia) to allow the 
sharing of space information.  In Congress, a 
new political willingness to fund space 
systems that would not be solely for national 
benefit or under purely national control would 
need to emerge.  At the technical level, new 
integration with allied industry would likely 
be necessary to create common standards and 
interfaces, which would initially cost time and 
money.  Still, given the emerging risks in 
space of and the possible benefits to be 
achieved by joint efforts, these problems do 
not seem insurmountable. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The challenges of space security today are 
typically viewed today as a state-centric 
rivalry for space supremacy: a highly 
nationalistic framework best suited to 
unilateral actions.46  The context of traditional 
balance-of-power politics, therefore, has 
colored the lenses of most observers, leading 
to predictions of a state-versus-state 
showdown in space, similar to great battles of 
naval armadas in centuries past.   However, 
under changing conditions, such a stove-piped 
view of space cooperation and operational 
practices may make 
less and less sense 
and may even 
increase risks to 
U.S. and allied 
space assets.  
Moreover, given the 
tightening financial 
situation in most 
allied countries 
today and in the United States itself, pooling 
resources may be the most effective means of 
building new capabilities.  As the 2009 NATO 
                                                
46 On this approach, see Gordon G. Chang, “The Space Arms 
Race Begins,” Forbes, November 5, 2009.   
spaced report concludes, “Increasing fiscal 
constraints demand increased cooperation to 
create synergy, reduce duplication of effort 
and ensure interoperability.”47   
 
This effort could begin with joint training 
among existing allies with more advanced 
military space experience and gradually 
building outward to include those allies with 
still-developing capabilities.  During this time, 
the more advanced militaries could begin to 
establish an information network to support 
operational cooperation and eventually feed 
into a proposed allied space organization.  As 
the assets of this body are developed, 
operational control could gradually be 
transferred from national to allied 
mechanisms, thus providing greatly enhanced 
peacetime deterrence and, when necessary, 
increased effectiveness in the use of 
conventional forces on the ground, at sea, and 
in the air.  Over time these institutions and 
practices could transform the business of 
space security from a national into an allied 
enterprise, spreading risk, reducing individual 
costs, and increasing reliability.  Part of the 
future-leaning agenda of such an organization 
might be to explore possible contacts with 
countries like India, Russia and, eventually, 
even China, in order to make restraint-based 
conflict prevention mechanisms for space 
truly international.  
 
As noted above, the United States is in a 
uniquely advantageous situation compared to 
China in having highly capable space partners 
who are also military allies.  As China space 
expert Gregory Kulacki argues, “China is 
concerned about the general effort of the US 
during the Bush Administration to form a 
Japanese-Indian alliance to contain China,” 
                                                
47 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, “NATO Space 
Operations Assessment,” p. 49. 
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including in space.48  But Washington needs to 
be careful not to overplay its hand.  Building a 
collaborative alliance in space to reduce 
vulnerability could be seen as destabilizing by 
outside parties.  Specifically, building an 
offensive-oriented space alliance, as noted by 
Morgan, is likely to threaten China and lead to 
hostile reactions and possibly a space arms 
race.  For this reason, the United States and its 
allies need to be careful about their rhetoric 
and, when possible, be inclusive in terms of 
confidence-building measures with other 
countries, portraying the alliance as 
defensively oriented and non-threatening to 
other countries.  Paths to cooperation with 
other parties through confidence-building 
measures, participatory space situational 
awareness, and community “policing” of 
space to identify bad behavior (such as 
jamming or laser interference) should also be 
encouraged.  New rules and even treaties 
might be considered later based on the non-
interference norms and newly established 
collective security practices developed by the 
alliance. 
 
In this context, collaborative efforts in allied 
space security may be a good first step toward 
reducing space vulnerabilities and helping the 
world avoid action-reaction arming for space 
and its harmful effects. But this active 
cooperation in space security, even among 
existing U.S. allies, will take time, money, 
technical resources, as well as political 
commitments from national leaders, given 
existing national security barriers.  Yet the 
negative implications of alternative paths that 
are foreseeable for space make these 
challenges worth addressing head on.  If this 
process is to succeed, moreover, it should 
begin soon, before new risks to U.S. and allied 
space security—and further offensive testing 
                                                
48 Kulacki quoted in Peter J. Brown, “China fears India-Japan 
space alliance,” Asia Times, November 12, 2008. 
by potential adversaries—emerge as 
alternative space norms. 
	  
	  
	  
 The 2010 National Space Policy: 
Down to Earth?  
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The 2010 National Space Policy, intended “to 
express the President’s direction for the 
Nation’s space activities,”1 was released by 
the Obama Administration on June 28.  
Responses were for the most part swift and 
predictable.  While drawing heavily from past 
consistent principles, all analysts agreed that 
the tone and emphasis differed significantly 
from the 2006 Bush Administration policy, 
which itself was a departure from past policies 
in terms of a greater military focus and 
nationalistic orientation.2 Views on which 
tone and emphasis is best has ranged along the 
ideological spectrum. A sampling of opinions 
is indicative. Baker Spring, from the 
conservative Heritage Foundation, focused on 
the Bush approach to space being “right” as 
much or more than analyzing the Obama 
policy.3 Jeff Keuter at The Marshall Institute 
provided a useful side-by-side comparison of 
the language, in part, it seems, toward 
establishing that the Bush policy was 
consistent with past policies and therefore any 
                                                
The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and 
do not represent the official position of the Department of the 
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McPherson, Ph.D., and Victoria Samson for their views on 
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1 Fact Sheet, The National Space Policy, The White House, 
June 28, 2010.  http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/fact-sheet-national-space-policy  
2 Joan Johnson-Freese, “The New U.S. Space Policy: A Turn 
Toward Militancy?” Issues in Science and Technology, 
Winter 2007. 
3 Baker Spring, “Obama’s National Space Policy: 
Subordinating National Security to Arms Control,” 
Webmemo, The Heritage Foundation, No. 2950, July 6, 2010. 
changes in the Obama policy required 
explanation for the shift.4 Michael Krepon at 
the Stimson Center positively noted the 
difference between the Bush and Obama 
policies regarding Obama’s renewed openness 
to consider diplomatic initiatives toward 
strengthening U.S. international leadership on 
space issues, but cited a lack of specifics about 
potential initiatives, appearing disappointed 
that the policy did not go further.5 Some 
analysts thought there were too many details, 
some not enough.  Experts on a panel held 
shortly after the policy was released sponsored 
by The Secure World Foundation (SWF) and 
The Arms Control Association (ACA) again 
noted content consistencies with the past, and 
differences in tone from the Bush policy. 
Independent analyst Marcia Smith from 
SpacePolicyOnline.com said it was “less 
nationalistic, more friendly” but noted “she 
had a friend” who viewed it as a “policy of 
appeasement rather than leadership.”  Bruce 
MacDonald from the U.S. Institute for Peace 
said he for one was “overall quite pleased with 
the revised policy”,6  Not surprisingly, 
professionals and pundits alike read the policy 
                                                
4 Jeff Keuter, “Evaluating the Obama National Space Policy: 
Continuity and New Priorities,” Policy Outlook, The George 
C. Marshall Institute, July 2010; The Space Foundation 
provided an comparison as well, U.S. national Space Policy 
Comparison: Comparing the 2010 National Space Policy to 
the 2006 National Space Policy, 
www.SpaceFoundation.org/research 
5 Michael Krepon, “The Obama Administration’s National 
Space Policy,” 30 June 2010.  
http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=983  
6 Panel Discussion – The New National Space Policy: 
Prospects for International Cooperation and Mankind Safe 
Safer for All. July 1, 2010. 
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much like a Rorschach test, interpreting it 
largely based on long-established prior 
perspectives. Across the spectrum of opinion, 
all acknowledged that the devil is in the 
details of implementation.  
 
My own view of the policy is most akin to that 
of SWF attorney Ben Baseley-Walker, another 
SWF/ACA panel member. He summarized it 
as “a very sound, pragmatic approach.”  I 
would call it simply a realistic policy.  It has 
both strengths and weaknesses, but overall, 
commendably, it attempts to inject realism 
into future U.S. space planning, and realism 
will ultimately strengthen U.S. security.  
While inherently more long-term focused and 
therefore less immediately satisfying, it is 
important to remember the classic military 
requirement for an executable, successful plan 
of attack -- alignment of ends-ways-means. 
Certainly the requirement for a prolonged U.S. 
military presence in Iraq after the initial 
shock-and-awe success demonstrated how a 
mismatch between those key elements can 
result.  Unfortunately, looking long-term will 
likely not bode well for the Obama 
Administration, as the last thing many 
American people seem to want, and therefore 
politicians will support, is a policy that 
recognizes and addresses the changing 
realities of the space environment. 
Nevertheless, several areas of change in the 
policy specifically reflect looking at the world 
as it is, rather than how the United States 
wants it to be.   
 
 
Reality as Risky Political Business 
 
Andrew Bacevich in his 2008 book The Limits 
of Power: The End of American 
Exceptionalism examines President Jimmy 
Carter’s 1979 speech to the American people 
about self-indulgence (specifically regarding 
oil) and what Bacevich terms “profligacy.” 
That speech was quickly dubbed “the malaise 
speech” by his political opponents, though the 
word malaise was never used by Carter.  His 
opponent for the presidency, Ronald Reagan, 
countered with “morning in America” talks 
which, Bacevich says convinced Americans 
that “credit has no limits, the bills will never 
come due.”7  Fast-forward to the October 19, 
2009, cover of The National Review.  It 
featured a cover image of a robed Obama 
wearing his Nobel medal while contemplating 
a bust of Carter. Clearly Obama is intended to 
be viewed as the snooty, contemporary 
version of Carter, bearer of bad news and 
pessimism.  
 
In some quarters, the contemporary additive to 
the malaise rhetoric is that of decline; 
instilling fear in the American public that if 
we don’t act (panic) now and act aggressively, 
America will fall off the precipice of 
hegemony and into economic, political and/or 
social decline. "Decline," The National 
Review cover stated, "is a Choice." Using 
declinist images and rhetoric is perhaps to be 
expected in partisan politics. However, it is 
both hackneyed and hyperbolic; eventually 
each cycle of declinism gives way to reality.8 
 
James Fallows in his January/February 2010 
article in The Atlantic addresses this notion. 
He points out that declinism is woven into our 
culture. “Thomas Jefferson was sure the 
country was going to hell when John Adams 
supported the Alien and Sedition Acts.  And 
Adams was sure it was going to hell when 
                                                
7 Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of 
American Exceptionalism, (New York, Metropolitan Books, 
2008) p.36. 
8 Joan Johnson-Freese and Thomas M. Nichols, “U.S. Less 
Dominant But So What?” Op-Ed, DOD Buzz, November 25, 
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Jefferson was elected.”9 While assuring us that 
America has historically gone through cycles 
of crisis and renewal, he also reminds us that 
renewal takes effort, sometimes based on hard 
choices, and addressing issues and problems 
realistically.10 
 
This pragmatic approach, however, is not the 
stuff of the polarized partisan politics sadly 
characterizing America today. More typically 
seen is the profligacy of which Bacevich 
warns, generalized public anger, and a distinct 
disdain of expertise – the latter especially 
dangerous on issues such as space where the 
laws of physics prevail over ideology and 
wishful thinking. National security, however, 
is not well served by wishful thinking, nor is 
realism synonymous with decline.  Space 
assets are too important as vital national 
interests – and stated as such in both the Bush 
and Obama policies -- to be subjected to the 
facile analysis of “declinism” and “gut” 
analysis rather than sound, though admittedly 
difficult, realistic strategic planning for a 
stable and secure future. 
 
 
Tone and Leadership 
 
 
The Obama policy begins with two epigraphs, 
one from President Eisenhower and one from 
President Obama.  These epigraphs speak to 
the consistent connection between American 
goals in space and improving life on Earth, 
and their relationship to American leadership 
more broadly.  They establish a cooperative 
tone and put forth an important justification 
for space activity for those who still question 
why we spend finite U.S. resources on space 
rather than here on Earth.  
 
                                                
9 James Fallows, “How America Can Rise Again,” The 
Atlantic, January/February 2010, p 48. 
10 Ibid, p 55. 
Here is President Eisenhower in 1958: 
 
More than by any other imaginative 
concept, the mind of man is aroused 
by the thought of exploring the 
mysteries of outer space. Through 
such exploration, man hopes to 
broaden his horizons, add to his 
knowledge, improve his way of living 
on Earth.  
 
And President Obama today: 
 
Fifty years after the creation of 
NASA, our goal is no longer just a 
destination to reach.  Our goal is the 
capacity for people to work and learn 
and operate and live safely beyond 
Earth for extended periods of time, 
ultimately in ways that are more 
sustainable and even indefinite. And 
in fulfilling this task, we will not only 
extend humanity’s reach in space – 
we will strengthen America’s 
leadership on Earth. 11 
 
These epigraphs talk about all people being 
able to fully utilize space and the benefits it 
yields, thereby setting the stage for an 
internationally cooperative policy.12  
 
The 2006 Bush policy, by contrast, was either 
more assertive and patriotic, or more caustic 
and bombastic, depending on ideological 
perspective.  While domestic opinion was 
split, international opinion leaned heavily 
toward the latter.  The Times of London 
perhaps best summed up the international 
view in an October 19, 2006, commentary 
entitled “America Wants it All – Life, the 
Universe, and Everything.” There the author 
posited that space apparently was no longer 
the final frontier, but the 51st state of the 
                                                
11 U.S. National Space Policy, June 28, 2010.  p. 1 
12 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose called 
international cooperation a “key cornerstone” of the new 
policy. Press Conference: Deputy Assistant Secretary Frank 
A. Rose – U.S. National Space Policy 2010, July 13, 2010. 
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United States. It went on to say that “The new 
National Space Policy that President Bush has 
signed is comically proprietary in tone about 
the U.S.’s right to control access to the rest of 
the solar system.”13  
 
The Obama tone reflects the reality that 
leadership cannot be coerced (at least not 
indefinitely) and true 
leadership requires 
others wanting to 
follow. While many of 
the same points are 
reiterated in the 
Obama policy as in the 
prior Bush policy, they 
are reiterated in less nationalistic language and 
recognize that a right declared by the United 
States is going to be expected to have 
universal application.   
 
Jeff Foust points out a useful example of 
difference in tone and language in his article, 
“A Change in Tone in National Space Policy”: 
 
For example, the Bush policy stated 
“The United States considers space 
systems to have the rights of passage 
through and operations in space 
without interference.  Consistent with 
this principle, the United States will 
view purposeful interference with its 
space systems as an infringement on 
its rights.” Contrast that with the new 
policy: “The United States considers 
the space systems of all nations to 
have the rights of passage through, 
and conduct of operations in, space 
without interference.  Purposeful 
interference with space systems, 
                                                
13 Bronwen Maddox, “America Wants it All – Life, the 
Universe, and Everything,” The Times (London), October 19, 
2006. 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/bronw
en_maddox/article605583.ece.  See also: “Russian official 
slams new US space policy as leading to confrontation,” BBC 
Monitoring Former Soviet Union, December 1, 2006;  “Bush 
Doctrine goes into space: Unilateralism at the last frontier,” 
Sydney Morning Herald (Australia) , October 23, 2006, p.14. 
including supporting infrastructure, 
will be considered an infringement of 
a nation’s rights.” The Bush policy 
spoke only of interference with US 
space systems, while the Obama 
policy refers to interference with any 
nation’s space systems.14  
 
 If the goal of the United States is to maintain 
space as a peaceful, secure and sustainable 
environment for the benefit of all - a global 
commons - then it must lead by example and 
in a way that others are willing to follow. 15  
 
With almost one thousand space assets in orbit 
critical to all aspects of our way of life and 
security, and almost half belonging to the 
United States,16 “stability” is not just a 
realistic policy goal, but a security imperative. 
It is not in the interest of the United States to 
have the space environment (more) littered 
and volatile. Bruce MacDonald pointed out 
that the 2009 Strategic Posture Review 
Commission reached similar conclusions 
about space. MacDonald, who served as 
Senior Director to the Commission, noted the 
commission recommendation “that the U.S. 
should develop and pursue options for U.S. 
interests and stability in space, including the 
possibility of negotiated measures.” This 
commission was not a group of left-wing 
ideologues; it was six Republicans and six 
Democrats headed by former Defense 
                                                
14 Jeff Foust, “A change in tone in national space policy,” The 
Space Review, July 6, 2010. 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1660/1  
15 See, America’s Future in Space: Aligning the Civil Space 
Program With National Needs, National Research Council, 
2009, p. 44. 
16 See Union of Concerned Scientists Satellite Database. 
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Secretaries Perry and Schlesinger.17 While 
turning from unilateralism and an emphasis on 
space war to a new tone of internationalism 
and stability is clearly viewed by some as 
“weakness,”18 the Obama Administration, 
perhaps recalling that the 2009 Schriever V 
space wargame clearly demonstrated the need 
for allies and partners in times of conflict,19 is 
striving for less chest thumping and more 
cooperation. 
 
Like it or not, the United States is not the only 
spacefaring nation. Other countries 
increasingly see space assets as requisite tools 
for success in a globalized world because of 
the information they yield.   They are not 
willing to forego their ownership and use, and 
in fact are seeking to expand both. This is a 
reality the United States must acknowledge 
and deal with - as the 2010 policy does - 
rather than trying 
to discourage and 
hinder the use of 
space by others, 
as has been the 
case for those 
who see an 
increase in 
China’s space 
capabilities as 
inherently zero-sum for the United States.  In 
other words, trying to maintain the status quo 
so that U.S. preeminence (or what some call 
dominance) can never be challenged is 
unrealistic. Whether other countries with, in 
some cases, rapidly maturing space programs 
                                                
17 Panel Discussion – The New National Space Policy: 
Prospects for International Cooperation and Mankind Safe 
Safer for All. July 1, 2010. 
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18 Taylor Dinerman, “National Space Policy,” from Strength 
to Weakness, July 16, 2010. http:// www.hudson-
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19 See articles reviewing Schreiver V in High Frontier, Vol. 5. 
No. 4, 
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-090827-008.pdf  
– China, India, Iran, Brazil, and Nigeria, for 
example -- will be willing to step up to the 
challenge of acting as responsible spacefaring 
actors remains to be seen, but it is evident that 
the world is not willing to follow a leader who 
seems primarily self-interested.   
 
Reasserting U.S. space leadership will pay 
important dividends on Earth. The United 
States unquestionably “leads” space activity 
based on sheer numbers of assets and the 
ability to use them. But when considering 
metrics such as United Nations’ voting 
coalitions on space issues, where the United 
States is often in a minority even against our 
allies, and the decreasing share of foreign 
satellite orders going to U.S. firms, U.S. 
leadership has been lacking for some time. 
The 2009 National Research Council report, 
America’s Future in Space, directly spoke to 
space enhancing U.S. strategic leadership on 
Earth. 
 
Strategic leadership for the United 
States means thinking about the 
future in a way that sees beyond 
immediate and particularly American 
needs and policies – such as assuring 
access to resources or a temporary 
military advantage – and positioning 
the nation to help set an agenda for 
worldwide action. In considering both 
its own national interests and benefits 
to humankind, the United States 
should aim for more than immediate 
solutions to transitory problems and 
should find approaches that seek to 
shape the future.20 
 
Effectively re-asserting American 
leadership will help create a more 
stable and predictable environment in 
space and more realistically allow the 
United States to shape a secure and 
prosperous future.    
                                                
20 America’s Future in Space: Aligning the Civil Space 
Program With National Needs, National Research Council, 
2009, p. 42 
Trying to maintain 
the status quo so 
that U.S. 
preeminence can 
never be 
challenged is 
unrealistic. 
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Using all U.S. Tools to Protect 
Our Space Assets 
 
In admittedly simplistic terms, the 
United States has four basic categories 
of “tools” available to implement its 
policies abroad: diplomatic, 
informational, military and economic – 
sometimes referred to by the acronym 
DIME.  Alone and in combinations, 
they represent the spectrum of U.S. 
power. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, 
however, “power” has become a much 
more complicated concept.  No longer 
does power simply equate to kinetic, or 
“hard,” power deliverable by platforms 
that can be counted and countered. 
Joseph Nye coined the term “soft 
power,” though initially Donald 
Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defense, 
said he didn’t “know what that 
means.”21  Walter Russell Mead 
distinguished between sharp power 
(military), soft power (cultural power, 
the power of examples), sweet power 
(values, culture, and policy, and setting 
the agenda) and sticky power 
(economic).22  At her Senate 
confirmation hearing, Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton took these a step 
farther, calling for the United States to 
execute “smart power,” a combination 
of diplomacy and defense, to restore 
American power.23  Clearly, the United 
States is preeminent in its hard, or 
                                                
21 See:  Joseph Nye, Jr. “Think Again: Soft Power,” Foreign 
Policy, March 1, 2006, 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/think-again-soft-power  
22 Walter Russell Mead, Power, Terror, Peace and War, 
(New York, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004) pp. 24-25. 
23 Anne E. Kornblut and Glenn Kessler, “In Foreign Policy, A 
New Trio at the Top,” Washington Post, January 13, 2009. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/01/12/AR2009011203510.html  
sharp, power capabilities. After the 
invasion of Iraq, the United States was 
viewed by much of the world as 
relying too heavily on the military 
sharp power tool, and as a first choice. 
But in a globalized world populated 
with transnational and non-traditional 
threats and challenges, not all are 
effectively dealt with by kinetic power.  
Increasingly, effective abeyance 
requires coordinated international 
efforts, and reliance on hard power and 
coercion is counterproductive if they 
alienate those with whom we must 
work to be successful.  
 
All the tools of U.S. power must be 
available.  The United States must be 
willing and able to use its sharp power 
if necessary, but it shouldn’t be the 
first or only option, and it may not be 
the best option. The 2006 policy states 
that the United States should “develop 
capabilities, plans, and options to 
ensure freedom of action in space, and, 
if directed, deny such freedom of 
action to adversaries.”  The 2010 
policy instead uses the language 
“develop capabilities, plans, and 
options to deter, defend against, and if 
necessary, defeat efforts to interfere 
with or attack U.S. or allied space 
systems.” The Obama space policy 
recognizes the potential for using hard 
power, but also recognizes that such 
use (and the debris it creates) could be 
damaging to U.S. assets as well, and so 
adjusts the tone to encourage 
cooperation, and opens the door to a 
greater use of diplomacy.  That door, 
though rhetorically not completely 
slammed shut during the Bush years, 
had de facto been largely ignored.  
 
What increased diplomacy will mean 
in practice remains to be seen and will 
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not be without difficulties. What 
stance the United States will take at 
future United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament meetings and votes will 
be indicative.  For many years the 
conference has pursued an agenda item 
called “Prevention of an Arms Race in 
Space” (PAROS). While the United 
States has since 2002 cast the only 
“no” vote against a resolution to 
establish a working group on PAROS, 
in 2009 it switched its vote to an 
abstention – a small but significant 
step in the right direction.  
Additionally, another resolution, this 
one Russian-led, called “Transparency 
and Confidence-building Measures in 
Outer-space,” encourages states to 
submit concrete proposals on 
international confidence building and 
transparency measures to the U.N. 
Secretary General.  While the United 
States voted “no” in 2008, it declined 
to participate in 2009, thereby 
allowing the resolution to be adopted 
by consensus.24 The United States had 
previously been a consistent obstacle 
to furthering such cooperation.  This 
obstructiveness had allowed China and 
Russia, the two countries which have 
set forth proposals for a treaty banning 
the use of weapons in space and the 
transparency resolution, to portray the 
United States as opposing peace in 
space and as perhaps its greatest threat. 
U.S. rhetoric, through the 2006 
National Space Policy, and actions at 
the United Nations, made it 
understandable that other countries 
would accept this portrayal. 
 
It is unlikely that the United States will 
(or even should) support a space 
                                                
24Paul Meyer, “US Space Security Policy: Still in Orbit or 
Commencing Re-entry?” unpublished assessment. July 2010. 
weapons treaty.  The United States 
generally has not been favorably 
inclined toward 
multilateral 
treaties in 
recent years, 
dating back to 
the Clinton 
Administration.  
Alternatively, 
Ben Baseley-
Walker refers to the potential for “soft-
law” options toward actions 
management.25  This could include 
efforts such as Codes of Conduct, or 
Rules of the Road, which have drawn 
increasingly support from European 
countries, commercial organizations, 
and even from within the U.S. 
military26 - indeed anyone seriously 
interested in protecting the space 
environment.  
 
The idea is that actors should and can 
learn to manage their actions toward a 
stable and sustainable space 
environment.  When the United States 
tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon 
in 1985 by destroying its Solwind 
satellite, and China tested its ASAT in 
2007, neither explicitly broke any 
specific “rules” or laws.27 But each 
                                                
25 Panel Discussion – The New National Space Policy: 
Prospects for International Cooperation and Mankind Safe 
Safer for All. July 1, 2010. 
www.armscontrol.org/events/newnationalspacepolicy 
26See: Answers to Advance Questions for General Kevin P. 
Chilton, USAF, Nominee for Commander, U.S. Strategic 
Command. http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/September/Chilton%2009-
27-07.pdf  
27Lawyers could argue that Article 9 of the Outer Space 
Treaty required consultations ahead of time for actions that 
could affect others’ space assets.  It could also be argued that 
since the United States had observed prior Chinese fly-by 
tests and likely knew of the potentially upcoming impact test, 
it had a responsibility to warn others. As with all legal 
arguments, however, it is likely both arguments would be 
refuted as not applying for one reason or another. 
It is unlikely the 
United States 
will (or even 
should) support 
a space 
weapons treaty. 
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created a substantial amount of space 
debris potentially dangerous to other 
spacecraft.  The United States 
subsequently adjusted its manner of 
testing, as a matter of self-interest.  
China, after the rightful international 
condemnation it suffered consequent 
to its debris-creating 2007 ASAT test, 
seemed to learn as well. When China 
tested similar technology again in 
2010, the test was characterized as a 
missile defense test and conducted 
more along the political and technical 
lines of what the United States did 
when it deliberately destroyed its 
malfunctioning USA-193 at a lower 
orbit, indirectly rather than explicitly 
testing ASAT technology, thereby 
avoiding both political condemnation 
and the creation of lingering debris. 
 
As a matter of fact, China created the 
biggest space mess in history with its 
ASAT weapon in 2007, at the very 
time the United States was aiming for, 
or claiming, space dominance. That 
test deflated if not dispelled 
completely the idea that the United 
States could technologically protect its 
space assets by constantly playing 
defense better than anyone else could 
play offense.  The Chinese quickly and 
harshly demonstrated both the 
ineffectiveness of bellicosity and the 
tenuousness of space dominance. It is 
possible to establish air dominance 
over a specific area for a limited time. 
The same is true for sea control. But 
unless the United States is willing and 
able to shoot down anything that 
anyone launches that we don’t approve 
of, anytime and anywhere – and deal 
with the consequent creation of an 
orbital debris mess, to say nothing of 
potentially igniting a war – claiming 
dominance leaves the United States to 
preach that others should “do as we 
say, not as we do.”  
 
 
Implementation Complications 
 
The single-most complicating 
factor in space policy stems from the 
vast majority of space technology 
being dual-use, over 90% by most 
approximations.  The term “dual-use” 
has two equally important meanings: 
1) that the same basic technology has 
applications in both the civil and 
military sectors, and 2) that it is often 
difficult to distinguish whether 
military space technology is intended 
for defensive or offensive use. Much 
of the world considers investment in 
dual-use technology a good investment 
since it can be used for multiple 
applications.  The United States, 
however, with its more highly 
bifurcated civil and military programs 
than other countries (and with larger 
budgets), largely considers dual-use 
technology as an opportunity for 
countries like China, Iran and North 
Korea to develop military technology 
for nefarious use under civilian guise.  
 
For example, imagery satellites are 
neutral in themselves; the way the 
imagery they produce is used - 
whether for crop rotation or targeting 
weapons - determines whether it is a 
civil or military asset, or in the case of, 
for example, the Japanese Information 
Gathering Satellite (IGS) system, 
both.28 By some U.S. accounts, nearly 
all Chinese space assets are military, 
though often very similar 
                                                
28 Joan Johnson-Freese and Lance Gatling, “Security 
Implications of Japan’s Information Gathering Satellite 
System,” Intelligence & National Security, Issue 19/3 (2004). 
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technologically to U.S. civil programs.  
In another case, as long as the United 
States pursues missile defense, some 
countries will consider the United 
States as having an (offensive) anti-
satellite capability because the 
technology is so well-suited for the 
ASAT mission. The self-
congratulatory American media 
coverage after the successful 
intentional destruction of USA-193 
basically confirmed that ASAT 
capability to the world. “The 
unprecedented downing of an errant 
spy satellite by a Navy missile makes 
it clear that the Pentagon has a new 
weapon in its arsenal – an antisatellite 
missile adapted from the nation’s 
missile defense system.” 29  
 
Though space has long been 
militarized, the Bush Administration 
continued to assert that the Rubicon of 
actual space weaponry had yet to be 
crossed. 30 But dual-use technology 
blurs the line between militarization 
and weaponization considerably. 
While the Obama Administration has 
backed away from initial indications it 
would ban space weapons, it has 
encouraged instead other avenues for 
“actions management” - ways to 
distinguish between legitimate military 
uses of space and weaponization, or at 
least to discourage weaponization.  
 
Strengthening measures to mitigate 
orbital debris, an example of “actions 
management,” is given a special nod as 
part of the stated 2010 policy goal of 
                                                
29 Marc Kaufman and Josh White, “Spy Satellite Downing 
Shows a New Weapons Capability,” Washington Post, 
February 22, 2008, A03. 
30 Although Baker Spring says in his July 6, 2010 Webmemo 
that “space has been weaponzied since the dawn of the space 
age.” 
“strengthening stability in space” 
through “domestic and international 
measures”31 and elaborated on in 
discussion regarding preserving the 
space environment.32 Ideally that 
might mean a treaty to prohibit certain 
debris-creating actions. Realistically, 
however, ratification of such a treaty 
would likely evoke a partisan battle in 
the Senate, framed as between those 
who want to protect national security 
and those who are willing to forego it 
for the sake of soft international goals.  
Bacevich sees the former group as 
supporters of an “Ideology of National 
Security” that allows American 
profligacy - and reality avoidance - to 
prevail.33   
 
Policy language that “The United 
States will consider proposals and 
concepts for arms control if they are 
equitable, effectively verifiable, and 
enhance the national security of the 
United States and its allies” could also 
present real difficulties in making that 
ideal occur, to the likely 
disappointment of many. Under what 
circumstances, for example, could a 
space treaty be considered verifiable?  
Though verification has long been 
considered a potential “stopper” for 
space arms control mechanisms, there 
are efforts underway to specify 
conditions for verifiability from both a 
political and technical perspectives.34 
                                                
312010 NSP, p. 4. 
322010 NSP, p. 7 
33See: Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of 
American Exceptionalism, (New York, Metropolitan Books, 
2008), pp. 74-84. 
34See: Ambassador Roger G. Harrison, Space and 
Verification, Volume I: Policy Implications, Eisenhower 
Center for Space & Defense Studies, 2011; Dr. David 
Finkleman, Space and Verification, Volume II: Technical 
Assessment, Eisenhower Center for Space & Defense Studies, 
2011.  
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Though still preliminary, it is 
heartening that discussion has begun 
rather than simply being assumed to be 
“too hard.” In the meantime, efforts for 
debris management, support for 
increased space situational awareness, 
and the fragile support for arms control 
indicate a more likely path toward 
actions management, rather than the 
creation of a legal regime that may not 
be able to be enforced anyway. 
Equally important, while the Obama 
Administration clearly wants to return 
U.S. space policy back to within 
mainstream international views, it 
must do so within domestic 
considerations.  Politics is the art of 
the possible, not the ideal.  Thus, while 
those who would support a treaty 
actually have a realistic view of the 
debris problem as one unsolvable by 
hard power unilateralism, a treaty is 
just as likely an unrealistic approach to 
solving it. Creativity will be at a 
premium. 
 
 
JetBlue to Space? 
 
 
A plethora of studies and 
commissions, particularly in the 
1980’s and 1990’s, have looked at how 
to “fix” space, meaning how to more 
effectively utilize government 
resources and grow the space 
development field.35 Fairly 
                                                
35See, for example, Pioneering the Space Frontier, the 1986 
report of the National Commission on Space; the 1987 
Leadership and America’s Future in Space generated by the 
first American woman in space, Sally Ride; the Space 
Architect Study done by DOD in 1988; the 1990 Report of the 
Advisory Committee on the Future of the US space Program 
(the Augustine committee); the 1991 Synthesis Group Report 
(the Stafford committee); the 1992 reports from the National 
Space Council and the Vice-President’s Space Policy 
Advisory Board, The Future of US Space launch Capability 
 
consistently, findings fall along three 
general axes: lower launch costs, more 
cooperation between the civil and 
military space communities, and more 
commercial involvement.  We have 
known the necessary goals for some 
time, yet all remain elusive. Since 
President Obama clearly intends to 
rely considerably on commercial space 
for achieving his human spaceflight 
plans, as became 
clear with the FY 
2011 NASA budget 
request, more 
appears to be riding 
on this iteration of 
the expanding 
commercial space 
effort of “fixing space” than in the 
past.  This pragmatic approach seems 
necessary as the U.S. human 
spaceflight program has, since Apollo, 
often been funded by unsupportable 
methods, somewhat analogous to using 
a Mastercard to pay off a Visa. So this, 
again, is an attempt at a realistic 
approach to an old problem. 
 
This pragmatic approach has not seen 
universal acclaim; the cancellation of 
the Constellation program brought 
American-hero astronauts Neil 
Armstrong and Eugene Cernan out 
from retirement to protest. They 
claimed the move was “devastating” to 
the space program and that Obama’s 
new plan was a “blueprint” to get to 
“nowhere.”36 Their angst is 
understandable. It is like watching the 
                                                
 
and A Post Cold War Assessment of US Space Policy, and the 
1992 National Research Council report From Earth to Orbit.  
36Kathy Steinmetz, “Moonwalkers Defense Spaceflight at 
Senate Hearing,” Time, May 13, 2010. 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1989024,00.h
tml  
We have known 
the necessary 
goals for some 
time, yet all 
remain elusive. 
Space and Defense, Summer 2011 33 
 
 
auto plants in Michigan close up and 
move to Mexico. But both candidates 
Obama and McCain realistically had to 
tell voters in Michigan that those auto 
manufacturing jobs weren’t coming 
back. In the same vein, economic 
realities have left President Obama to 
tell disappointed space enthusiasts that 
the Constellation program was being 
cancelled. This is a particularly bitter 
pill to swallow during very difficult 
economic times, as jobs were 
subsequently lost in key aerospace 
states like Florida, Alabama, Texas 
and California. Nonetheless, the adage 
“only poets write strategy without a 
budget” comes to mind when 
retrospectively viewing the 
Constellation program from its roots in 
the 2004 Bush Vision for Space 
Exploration speech.37 The reality is – 
as supported by the report of the 2009 
Augustine Commission,38 specifically 
created to advise the President on the 
human spaceflight program – 
Constellation, as it stood at the time of 
cancellation, suffered an irrecoverable 
ends-ways-means mismatch such as 
discussed prior. As the program stood, 
potential success was an illusion.   
 
Based on the cancellation of 
Constellation and his speech in April 
2010,39 the Obama Administration 
appears to have largely heeded the 
advice of the Augustine Commission. 
                                                
37 Statement by Joan Johnson-Freese, Senate Hearing on 
Reauthorizing the Vision for Space Exploration, May 7, 2008. 
http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=27924  
38 Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great 
Nation, October 2009.  
http://legislative.nasa.gov/396093main_HSF_Cmte_FinalRep
ort.pdf 
39 Kenneth Chang, “Obama Vows Renewed Space Program,” 
New York Times, April 15, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/science/space/16nasa.ht
ml 
The commission recommended taking 
a flexible approach to exploration if 
significant budget increases were not 
forthcoming, which were not. Obama’s 
epigraph at the beginning of the 2010 
NSP says the United States’ goals in 
space go beyond “a destination to 
reach.” Coupled with the cancellation 
of Constellation, it is clear we are no 
longer racing the Chinese (back) to the 
Moon, a race we handily won against 
the Soviets in 1969, but in which we 
stood a good chance of losing this time 
around.  Likely anticipating the outcry 
from those at a loss without 
destinations and timetables, however, 
it also states the United States will 
“begin crewed missions beyond the 
moon, including sending humans to an 
asteroid” by 2025 and “by the mid-
2030s, send humans to orbit Mars and 
return them safely to Earth.”40  Clearly 
these were intended to reassure 
skeptics that the future of human 
spaceflight remained a priority.  
Personally, I think it was a mistake to 
include timetables for which there are 
no programs authorized or funding to 
achieve them.  The political will to 
fund human spaceflight to a level 
commensurate for success within a 
timetable is unlikely to be any stronger 
for a new program than it was to fund 
Constellation. This is where (and why) 
the commercial sector is being counted 
on to step up. 
 
That commercial, civil, and national 
security space sector guidelines for 
policy implementation are listed in the 
2010 National Space Policy beginning 
with the commercial space sector and 
ending with national security space 
sector has been analyzed with 
                                                
402010 NSP, p.11. 
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Talmudic scrutiny. Those who 
consider space-related national 
interests as equating first and foremost 
to the national security space sector 
have cited that ordering as indicative 
that national security has been 
subordinated to arms control in this 
NSP.41  Government strategies are 
intended to be in alignment like 
“nested” Russian dolls, one fitting 
within the other. If the NSP is nested 
within the National Security Strategy 
(NSS), as is likely and intended, then 
the space sector prioritization is not 
really surprising. While the 2006 NSS 
began with the words “America is at 
war,”42 clearly and unequivocally 
focusing America on the fight against 
terrorism, the Obama NSS begins with 
a note of change. 
 
Time and again in our nation’s 
history, American’s have risen to 
meet – and shape – moments of 
transition. This must be one of those 
moments. We live in a time of 
sweeping change. The success of free 
nations, open markets, and social 
progress in recent decades has 
accelerated globalization on an 
unprecedented scale. This has opened 
the doors of opportunity around the 
globe, extended democracy to 
hundreds of millions of people, and 
made peace possible among the major 
powers. Yet globalization has also 
intensified the dangers we face – 
from international terrorism and the 
spread of deadly technologies, to 
economic upheaval and a changing 
climate.43 
 
                                                
41See: Baker Spring, “Obama’s National Space Policy: 
Subordinating National Security to Arms Control,” 
Webmemo, The Heritage Foundation, No. 2950, July 6, 2010.  
42 http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/    
43http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/nat
ional_security_strategy.pdf 
The importance of national security is 
not downgraded, but it is being defined 
more broadly and realistically.  In 
terms of space, “change” means 
attempting – and I say attempting in 
recognition of past efforts – to bring 
space development to a path more 
similar to other areas of high-tech 
development rather than the anomaly it 
has been. Whereas airplanes and 
computers required government 
investment as seed money to then 
(relatively quickly) allow a 
commercial sector to flourish, in 
human spaceflight, the tipping point 
for the commercial sector to overtake 
government efforts has yet to occur.  
More than fifty years after John Glenn 
orbited the Earth, the government still 
controls tickets to space much 
differently than passengers booking a 
ticket on Jetblue, an aberration in an 
era of globalization. 
 
Globalization has meant that 
capabilities like high resolution 
imagery, once available only to 
security communities in a very few 
countries, are now available on the 
commercial market. Globalization also 
means that countries are connected in 
ways that change how they can act and 
react in shaping and coercing the 
actions of others. Ben Baseley-Walker 
illustrates that point well when it 
comes to space. “If, for example, the 
United States blows up a Chinese 
satellite, what would I do if I were 
sitting in Beijing? Would I go and 
launch a missile at an American 
satellite? No, I would crash the 
dollar.”44 Space is a different venue 
                                                
44Panel Discussion – The New National Space Policy: 
Prospects for International Cooperation and Mankind Safe 
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than it was during the Cold War when 
governments controlled all assets, and 
hard power ruled the day. 
 
Despite the best attempts of some 
entrepreneurs, human spaceflight has 
remained largely the purview of 
governments.   Some of those best 
attempts have taught investor 
billionaires that space is an arena 
where large fortunes can quickly 
become small ones. PayPal founder 
Elon Musk got into the space launch 
business and founded the SpaceX 
Corporation, subsequently saying: “I 
want to be able to make sure that we 
have enough capital to survive at least 
three consecutive failures. If you want 
to make a small fortune in the launch 
vehicle business, start with a large 
one.”45 
 
Where the Obama policy offers new 
hope for the heretofore unattainable 
goal of commercial viability is in its 
definition of the commercial sector, 
including the omission of a previously 
laudable but unrealistic parameter.  
According to the NSP, commercial 
space “refers to space goods, services, 
or activities provided by private sector 
enterprises that bear a reasonable 
portion of the investment risk and 
responsibility for the activity, operate 
in accordance with typical market-
based incentives for controlling cost 
and optimizing return on investment, 
and have the legal capacity to offer 
these goods or services to existing or 
potential nongovernmental 
                                                
 
Safer for All. July 1, 2010. 
www.armscontrol.org/events/newnationalspacepolicy 
45http://www.evancarmichael.com/Famous-
Entrepreneurs/1610/Elon-Musk-Quotes.html  
customers.”46  A major change in this 
policy is the removal of a clause 
forbidding direct subsidies for 
commercial space, a ban included in 
both the Bush and Clinton policies. 
The apparent intent is to move U.S. 
commercial space activities onto a 
level playing field with most other 
spacefaring nations.  Is the Ariane 
rocket, for example, marketed through 
Arianespace, a commercial space 
venture?  It is certainly categorized as 
such within the international launch 
market, but the majority of shares are 
owned by the French government.47  
The French government also invested 
heavily in its development. The United 
States appears to be moving in the 
direction of this model, which other 
countries have long utilized.  Again, 
there is no guarantee that the 
commercial sector will step up to the 
challenge, but trying to change the 
status quo model to a more realistic 
and sustainable approach over the 
long-term is laudable. 
 
 
From Muddling Through to a 
Realistic Approach? 
 
It has been apparent for some time to 
those who scrutinize space budgets and 
timetables that a day of reckoning was 
coming, sooner rather than later.  That 
day has arrived.  In human spaceflight 
and exploration, you get what you are 
willing to pay for. Without a viable 
commercial sector, it is largely up to 
the American public, through their 
Members of Congress, to decide what 
                                                
462010 NSP, p.10. 
47The French space agency, Centre National d'Études 
Spatiales (CNES), owns 32%  of Arianespace. 
http://www.arianespace.com/about-us-corporate-
information/shareholders.asp  
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they need, in accordance with what 
they want to spend.  
 
While there are those in Congress who 
are angry and vocal over the 
cancellation of Constellation 
(including the loss of jobs in many of 
their districts) it must be remembered 
that Congress can always reallocate 
funds into the space budget if there 
really is enough political will to do so. 
In the early years of NASA, Congress 
provided more money than the agency 
requested in their eagerness to counter 
Soviet space achievements. Today, 
however, with competition for federal 
funding running the gamut across 
social welfare programs, job stimulus 
programs, on-going war efforts, 
domestic infrastructure, the 
environment, education, health care 
and more, human spaceflight will 
likely find itself with more rhetorical 
support than actual funding. 
 
The President has said space is a vital 
interest of the United States, but there 
are finite resources to meet infinite 
possible interests.  Though rhetorically 
supportive, the American public 
largely sees space exploration and 
development as admirable, but more 
expendable than schools, roads, health 
care, tax cuts and other priorities.48  
The Obama policy sets a way forward 
to try and achieve realistic goals within 
realistic budgets.  It will require 
unprecedented levels of cooperation 
                                                
48“50% Favor Cutting Back on Space Exploration,” 
Rasmussen Reports, January 15, 2010. 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/lifestyle/ge
neral_lifestyle/january_2010/50_favor_cutting_back_on_spac
e_exploration; Darren K. Carlson, “Space: to Infinity and 
Beyond on a Budget,” August 17, 2004. 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/12727/space-infinity-beyond-
budget.aspx  
with other countries and reform of 
Cold War-era, ham-fisted, complicated 
export control laws to allow the United 
States to work with other countries and 
revitalize its competitive place in the 
international 
aerospace 
market.49  The 
illusion that we 
can defend space 
technology 
exclusively with 
technology has 
been debunked 
and overcome by events, specifically 
the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. Yet 
whether the Obama Administration has 
the political capital to push the 
execution of this policy forward, and 
the political will to spend that capital 
on this issue, remains to be seen. 
 
Recognizing and choosing a new path 
forward, one perhaps less “visionary” 
in the short term, could be more 
realistic in the long term.  The auto 
manufacturing jobs are not coming 
back to Michigan and Ohio, and the 
United States is not going to be 
standing on the Moon in 2020.  But 
resistance to change will still be 
strong. 
 
Already there are signs that short-term, 
muddling-through advocates will not 
give up easily. The Senate Committee 
on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation unanimously agreed in 
July to an authorization bill plan to cut 
Constellation, but initiate development 
of a heavy-lift rocket in 2011, 
                                                
49See: Joan Johnson-Freese, “Becoming Chinese: Or, How 
U.S. Satellite Export Policy Threatens National Security,” 
Space Times, January-February 2001;  Joan Johnson-Freese, 
“Alice in Licenseland: U.S. Satellite Export Controls Since 
1990”,  Space Policy, August 2000. 
The Obama 
policy will require 
unprecedented 
levels of 
cooperation with 
other countries. 
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potentially to be ready for use by the 
end of 2016.  Again, politics being the 
art of the possible, that compromise 
provides jobs in aerospace states for 
politicians and near-term action for 
those who demand them. Not 
surprisingly, the money to start work 
on the heavy-lift vehicle will not be 
new money, but will be sliced from 
funds the administration proposed for 
developing new space technologies 
and commercial efforts.  Also, since 
the Senate bill only covers the next 
three years, it is unknown what will 
happen after that.50 So again, funding 
problems have not been realistically 
solved, just put off for somebody else 
to deal with. 
 
There will be those who will resist 
change in time-honored ways: slow-
rolling, dwelling on difficulties with 
past change efforts (just too hard), 
magnifying risks, and pointing out 
potential personal power impacts.   
Baker Spring warns against arms 
control agendas that “effectively 
circumvent the Senate’s constitutional 
role in consenting to the ratification of 
international agreements that should be 
concluded as treaties.”51 While 
certainly not advocating a treaty, he 
also objects to anything short of a 
treaty (such as a Code of Conduct) - 
effectively reinforcing the “status quo” 
- by cautioning the Senate that its 
power could be circumvented. 
Additionally, there are those in 
government and in Congress especially 
(on both sides of the aisle) who will 
oppose any sort of cooperation with 
                                                
50Kenneth Chang, “Senate Committee’s NASA Plan Cuts 
Moon Program,” The New York Times, July 15, 2010. 
51Baker Spring, “Obama’s National Space Policy: 
Subordinating National Security to Arms Control,” 
Webmemo, The Heritage Foundation, No. 2950, July 6, 2010.  
China on ideological grounds.52  There 
are also those who will oppose the 
NSP on simple partisan grounds. But 
the time for profligacy is over, and the 
time for renewal and reality-based 
decision-making is here.  
 
Those who have been pushing for the 
United States to move toward space 
dominance, to include the development 
of space weapons, under the guise of 
offensive-defensive capabilities or any 
other guise, will just have to try to wait 
out the President. While President 
Obama will likely not ban them, he 
also is unlikely to promote them. There 
are parallels in the space sector to that 
of the nuclear sector – where the 
President has said he wanted to move 
to “zero” but has found the path there 
strewn with political compromise and 
efforts by nuclear modernization 
stalwarts to “hold on” for the future. 
Space weapons advocates will likely 
do the same.  
 
The 2010 NSP offers a blueprint for 
renewal rather than a blueprint back to 
the Moon, or a space battle plan.  The 
challenge for NASA is to develop – 
quickly – innovative, affordable and, 
yes, inspiring, plans to take America 
forward in human and robotic space 
exploration.  The commercial sector’s 
challenge will be not only to facilitate 
NASA’s plans, but also to innovate 
and implement plans of their own to go 
beyond NASA and truly develop 
space.  The challenge for the military 
is to protect space as an environment 
for use by all, but especially the United 
States, without relying on potentially 
                                                
52See comments in: Peter J. Brown, Asia takes stock of new 
US space policy,” Asia Times, July 16, 2010. 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html  
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counterproductive, debris-creating, 
extremely expensive and technically 
unfeasible hardware. Taking up these 
challenges will yield not just benefits 
in space, but benefits regarding U.S. 
strategic leadership on Earth and in 
international security.  The new 
blueprint offers new technical goals 
and opportunities ahead, and the 
revitalization of our strategic 
leadership.  All are realistic goals 
worth pursuing. If we ignore them in 
favor of short-term, status quo 
approaches, it will ultimately be at the 
peril of U.S. national security. 
	  
	  
	  
 
 
	  
	  
 	  
Operationally Responsive Space: 
Past, Present and Future 
 
Stuart Eves 
Surrey Satellite Technology Limited 
 
 
The Past 
 
Where did the idea of Operationally 
Responsive Space originate? You might 
imagine that the idea was born during the First 
Gulf War, (sometimes called the First Space 
War), where use was made of strategic space 
systems to support operations. It was apparent, 
though, that strategic systems with very small 
fields of view and long revisit times were not 
well suited to operational reconnaissance. 
Other limitations of these strategic systems 
included a tasking system not suited for 
tactical timelines; significant data downlink 
requirements, making it difficult to deliver 
data into the theatre; a large in-theatre 
“footprint” for intelligence analysts; and lack 
of “command assurance” that the requested 
collection would not be pre-empted by higher 
national priorities, for which reason field 
commanders were unwilling to place reliance 
on them for critical operations. It is tempting 
to think that these limitations inspired system 
designers to conceive of constellations of 
smaller, more affordable satellites with wider 
fields of view. 
 
But in 1991, while the West was struggling to 
adapt the operations of its satellites to meet 
the demands of the conflict situation, the 
Russians were launching optical and RF 
surveillance satellites at an impressive rate. If 
the ORS programme does ever succeed in 
launching 18 low Earth orbit surveillance 
satellites in a four-month period like the 
Desert Shield operation, it will simply be 
emulating what the Russians achieved 20 
years ago. In the same period in 1991, the 
West launched just one military mission, and 
had Russia chosen to engage in that conflict, it 
is clear which side would have possessed the 
“information edge”. Analysts in the West 
quietly doffed their caps to the “operationally 
responsive” space programme in Moscow, 
who had comprehensively demonstrated a 
“Tier-2” launch-on-demand capability long 
before the concept was formally articulated in 
the West 
 
And the Russians didn’t stop there. In the mid-
1990’s they fielded a system called Arkon, 
which had an astonishing level of tactical 
capability. Placed in a high-altitude LEO, 
(with an apogee of 2750 km and a perigee of 
1500 km), this large mission, (which would be 
considered a “Tier-1” asset in today’s 
responsive space terminology), was able to 
deliver imagery with a resolution of better 
than five meters over enormous fields of 
regard. In the summer months, when the 
lighting in the Northern hemisphere was at its 
best, this single satellite could have provided 
between 8 and 10 images of a given point on 
the Earth’s surface per day, and its high-
altitude orbit would also have provided 
frequent opportunities for commanding and 
data dissemination.  
 
 
The Russian Arkon Satellite 
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The Arkon satellite had a repeating ground 
trace, allowing it provide repeat coverage 
from the same point in space when required. 
This capability allowed the imagery from two 
consecutive days to be compared very easily, 
highlighting changes which would focus the 
attention of the analysts on areas of interest 
within the very large imagery scenes.   
 
The Arkon satellite was large – it required a 
Proton launch vehicle to place it in orbit – but 
it was also agile. Illustrations released by the 
production organization in Russia showed at 
least four different modes of operation, 
including imaging of point targets, of areas, of 
lines of communication, and a mode in which 
the satellite could be trained on a specific 
location for tens of minutes if required.  
 
 
 
The Arkon Satellite’s Operational Modes 
 
Once again, analysts in the West doffed their 
caps!! 
 
The Present 
 
Tactically oriented satellites in the West have 
taken a different path, based on much smaller 
hardware, but it was not the United States who 
took the lead. Built in the United Kingdom, 
the TopSat satellite set a world record for 
“resolution per mass of satellite” by delivering 
better than three meter resolution imagery 
from a satellite platform weighing just 120 kg. 
For a satellite that cost less than $20m to build 
and launch, this mission set a new 
performance threshold. By the time TopSat 
was launched in 2005, the U.S. tactical space 
programme had commenced, and had assigned 
the designators TacSat-1, TacSat-2, TacSat-3, 
etc. Since TopSat preceded these US missions 
into orbit, collaborative experiments were 
conducted with U.S. researchers and TopSat 
was designated TacSat-0.   
   
The TopSat satellite and one of its images of 
Kirtland AFB, NM 
 
The specific technical trick that TopSat 
employed was to pitch backwards quite 
deliberately as it passed over its targets. This 
pitching motion slowed the effective ground 
rate of its sensor, allowing more light into the 
camera system, thereby getting close to the 
diffraction-limited performance of its 20 cm 
aperture telescope. This level of agility is only 
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possible with small, rigid satellites. Large 
platforms are seldom capable of achieving the 
angular rates required; and generally initiate 
vibrational modes that demand significant 
“settling time” before acceptable quality 
imagery can be collected. 
 
But TopSat’s pitching trick permits two other 
advantages that are key to ORS. One is that, if 
deployed into a sun-synchronous orbit, the 
satellite is no longer constrained to a local 
time of ascending node close to noon. It is 
able to extend the range of local times of day 
when imagery can be collected by pitching 
through a larger angle; compensating for the 
comparative lack of reflected sunlight near the 
terminator by slowing the ground rate of its 
sensor still further. The other key advantage is 
that a satellite like TopSat is no longer 
constrained to operate in a sun-synchronous 
orbit. If a satellite is deployed into a lower 
inclination orbit, (to provide more frequent 
revisits over operational regions, for instance), 
it is inevitable due to the laws of orbital 
dynamics that it will pass over its targets at 
different local times of day. For a larger 
satellite, this might be a problem, but for 
TopSat it simply means selecting an 
appropriate pitch rate for the local time of day 
and the prevailing lighting conditions.  
 
The low cost of the TopSat mission 
demonstrated the potential affordability of 
constellations of small satellites to provide 
significantly greater timeliness, but to date it 
is Germany which has exploited the 
constellation concept most effectively for 
military purposes. Germany now has two 5-
satellite constellations at its disposal; the 
military SAR system, SAR-Lupe, and the 
commercial RapidEye optical imaging system. 
SAR-Lupe and RapidEye are specifically 
designed to operate as constellations with 
much better revisit characteristics. The 
RapidEye constellation is comprised of small 
agile satellites which can roll off-nadir, 
meaning that the constellation can provide 
imaging opportunities over the entire globe at 
least once per day. And the SAR-Lupe 
satellites are equipped with an intersatellite 
link system which enables the satellites to 
transfer commanding information when they 
come within view of one-another and thereby 
enhance the response time of the system. 
 
 
In an ORS context, both these systems would 
be regarded as “Tier-1” capabilities, in that 
they are already “on-orbit”. However, they 
differ from the assets that have traditionally 
been assumed to comprise Tier-1 because they 
are not strategically oriented, single satellites 
being pressed into service as inefficient 
tactical surrogates.   
 
These systems differ philosophically from the 
missions in the TacSat and ORS programmes 
in at least three key respects:-  
 
• Firstly, they are clearly designed to 
operate as part of a constellation, (which 
affects all aspects of the satellite design, 
including both the payload and the 
platform). By contrast, the U.S. systems 
have yet to clearly indicate the “objective 
systems” that might result if the TacSat 
and ORS experiments are deemed 
successful. 
 
• Secondly, they are being used to support 
commercial and strategic applications 
whilst in orbit. It is arguable that one 
reason why the ORS programme in the US 
has not gained more momentum is that it 
is seeking to find funding for missions 
which, if only used over operational zones, 
are only going to be exploited for 1% or 
2% of the time. Clearly the value for 
money from a satellite is greatly enhanced 
if it can also be used to support other 
missions, such as homeland defense; 
commercial collection; operational 
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training; and the requirements of allies 
elsewhere on the globe.  
 
• Thirdly, they are expected to be launched 
once constructed, rather than being held on 
the ground as a series of sub-systems. For 
a commercial system like RapidEye, there 
is clearly a significant “opportunity cost” 
involved in having valuable hardware on 
the ground rather than in orbit, and even in 
the case of a military system such as SAR-
Lupe, the pace of change in small satellite 
design means that hardware can rapidly 
become technically obsolescent if kept in 
storage for too long, (which some might 
suggest was the fate of the original 
TacSat-1 payload) 
 
Now it might be argued that it is very difficult 
to design a satellite that can be used to support 
all these differing requirements, and this may 
once have been true. However, sensor and 
payload technology has advanced to the point 
where the agility of small satellites can 
support a number of different modes of 
operation. The SSTL-300, which is due for its 
first launch in May 2011, is a prime example.   
 
Some of these modes presume detailed 
advanced knowledge of the target regions, and 
so are more suited to strategic surveillance, 
whereas others cover larger regions and can 
provide support to operational and tactical 
missions. Moreover, the satellite is equipped 
with both wide area cameras and a high 
resolution camera on the same platform. This 
is analogous to the way that the human eye 
operates, with the lower resolution, wide-area 
“peripheral vision” cameras providing 
detection and cueing data for the higher 
resolution, small area camera that provides the 
high fidelity imaging.   
 
 
 
The SSTL-300 imaging satellite 
 
So where have the major successes of the 
ORS programme occurred to date? One of the 
principal achievements was the inclusion of 
both imagery and Radio Frequency (RF) 
surveillance sensors on the TacSat-2 mission. 
To extend the analogy with the human sensing 
system, this satellite had ears as well as eyes, 
and was therefore potentially capable of 
greater “self-cueing”.  (In practice, 
accommodation constraints and power budget 
limitations meant that TacSat-2 was not able 
to operate its eyes and ears simultaneously 
over the same region of the ground, but it 
certainly points towards the future.) 
 
Another clue to the future is provided by the 
feedback from the TacSat-3 mission. 
Equipped with a small-footprint hyper-
spectral sensor the satellite demonstrated the 
potential value of spectral imagery, if not the 
area coverage rate and timeliness required to 
support the warfighter. 
 
 
The Future 
 
As technologies continue to improve, the 
contribution that operationally responsive 
space systems can make to military operations 
will continue to increase. Charge Coupled 
Device (CCD) detectors now allow the 
imaging of far greater areas than was possible 
previously.  
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The image below shows the image footprint of 
a modern small satellite over Australia. The 
much smaller brown stripes across the 
continent are the footprints generated by the 
Landsat satellites at a comparable resolution. 
  
 
 
 
A comparison of current and historical 
coverage rates 
 
Clearly, the increased volumes of data 
generated by such sensors demand greater on-
board storage capacities, and higher data 
downlink rates, but again the rapid pace of 
development in terrestrial computing 
technologies is providing a solution to these 
problems. In the case of the SSTL-300, the 
demand for greater downlink capacity is being 
addressed via the development of a steerable 
data downlink antenna system which can track 
a specific ground station with a narrow beam-
width antenna, enabling the available satellite 
power to be concentrated into a smaller region 
and so deliver a higher capacity link budget. 
 
And as the power of on-board computing 
increases, it will become increasingly 
common to process the imagery data on board 
the satellite, and downlink a much smaller 
image file, rather than transfer the raw 
collection to the ground – although the raw 
data could be downloaded if necessary. 
 
And the nature of the connections available to 
transfer this data will also change. At present, 
the number of ground stations available to an 
ORS system is usually quite limited. This 
constrains both the speed with which the 
imagery data can be returned, and the overall 
capacity of the system, (since the number of 
times that the satellite’s on-board memory can 
be filled and emptied on a given day will also 
be dependent on its access to ground station 
facilities).  
 
Those downlink requirements are becoming 
more impressive all the time. An example is 
SSTL’s Earthmappper system, where a 
constellation of 5 satellites, each weighing just 
100 kg, now has the capability to image the 
entire landmass of the globe on a daily basis.  
 
Essentially the satellites are “always on”, and 
collect imagery whenever the mission is over 
the Earth’s surface. The challenge is clearly to 
ensure that this valuable imagery is down-
linked to the ground, and not trapped on orbit. 
 
In the next generation, it is expected that the 
use of inter-satellite links will become 
increasingly common on ORS assets. 
Currently, such links are generally reserved 
for grand strategic systems, but the success of 
UAV’s using satellite communication systems 
suggests that this will also become routine for 
satellites in the future. They are, after all, the 
ultimate high-flying UAV’s, and some, (e.g. 
ORS-1) are even based on modified airborne 
sensor technology! 
 
Another obvious solution to the downlink 
issue is to internationalize the ORS 
programme, providing the opportunity to 
access ground station facilities in multiple 
nations at different longitudes around the 
globe. A thirteen-nation MOU is currently in 
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the process of negotiation, and this has the 
potential to start the process of creating the 
“Coalition ORS” concept which has been 
proposed previously.  
 
Moreover, international collaboration between 
the United States and other nations already 
exists elsewhere in the space arena. One 
example is the use by the U.S. Government of 
leased capacity on Paradigm’s Skynet 5 
satellites, which were launched to provide 
secure communications for the UK MOD 
under an innovative procurement process 
which transferred significant risk to the 
contractor in exchange for a long duration 
contract. This arrangement establishes a 
precedent which could also be exploited in the 
surveillance domain if the UK elects to invest 
in a sovereign surveillance system. . The 
recently released U.S. National Space Policy 
and the DoD National Security Space Strategy 
both direct the use of coalitions where 
appropriate for both operational and 
geopolitical reasons. 
 
As satellites have become essential to war-
winning, they have increasingly become the 
target for anti-satellite capabilities – both in 
space and on the ground. Expect to see 
increasing efforts to protect satellites from 
such measures by the application of stealth 
technologies to the space vehicles and 
continuing efforts to harden the terrestrial 
networks and infrastructure against all forms 
of hostile interference. Augmenting existing 
satellite constellations with small satellites 
makes intentional or unintentional interference 
or denial of the overall capability more 
difficult.  Additionally, integrating space and 
terrestrial capabilities can further enhance the 
overall resilience of the system, and although 
breaking down “stovepipes” is difficult, this is 
another possible medium-term development. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, small 
satellites can radically change the calculus 
concerning satellite lifetimes. Smaller, 
cheaper satellites simply do not have to last as 
long as large satellites in order to deliver the 
same value for money. As a consequence, it is 
logical to consider deploying them in lower, 
shorter-lived orbits, and this could modify the 
overall approach to ORS enormously. 
Satellites closer to the Earth require smaller 
apertures and less power, with the result that 
the missions can be scaled down to the point 
where they become candidates for air-launch.  
 
These new technologies and new capabilities 
offer tremendous flexibility that will make the 
next generation of satellite constellations truly 
operationally responsive. 
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ABSTRACT: A strategy to safeguard United 
States’ space assets is needed.  Deterrence 
strategies, like Cold War nuclear deterrence, 
are often recommended.  Nuclear deterrence 
history reveals that deterrence through 
dominance is what early strategists employed.  
Both Cold War adversaries attempted 
repeatedly to gain the lead in nuclear 
weapons.  Seeking short term advantages 
activated the security dilemma and both sides 
responded in kind, guaranteeing an arms 
race. The faulty logic of the security dilemma 
was that the next advantage would bring 
security. This did not happen and illustrated 
how mutual vulnerability resulted from long 
term and determined opposition. That 
condition exists to this day, made bearable by 
agreements and procedures that reduce fear 
through increased transparency and 
verification. 
 
The 2001 Space Commission Report identified 
the threat of a “Space Pearl Harbor” and 
called for military solutions, including 
denying space to adversaries.  This set United 
States’ space policy on a course to repeat the 
Cold War mistake of seeking deterrence 
through dominance.  
 
The United States’ best option is to abandon 
space deterrence through dominance 
strategies and accept the inevitable end state 
of mutual vulnerability and thereby avoid 
engaging in a space arms race. A cooperative 
legal framework with transparency to assuage 
fear is the best policy, not because of an 
idealistic view of benevolent human nature, 
but because that will be the end result in the 
long run even after great effort and expense to 
dominate space. 
 
 
“I DO BELIEVE THAT MAN’S WISDOM IN 
AVOIDING WAR IS OFTEN SURPASSED BY HIS 
FOLLY IN PROMOTING IT.”1 
 
Space capabilities are vital to the United 
States.  It is critical, therefore, for the United 
States to develop an effective long term 
strategy to safeguard assets in space.  
Deterrence strategies based on the Cold War 
example are often discussed as a model for 
space.  Examining the evolution of nuclear 
deterrence reveals, however, that a deterrence 
model accepting long term vulnerability 
emerged after attempts at deterrence through 
dominance strategies failed.  The Cold War 
experience with two determined adversaries 
illustrates how the security dilemma can 
spawn an arms race.  In the long run, however, 
a situation of deterrence based on mutual 
vulnerability is the inevitable end state.  The 
deterrence found in mutual vulnerability is 
based on both sides having the ability to inflict 
harm.  It is deterrence from a position of 
reciprocal strength.  While dominance in a 
                                                
1Robert S. MacNamara, “The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy,” 
Department of State Bulletin 57, (9 October 1967), p. 450. 
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military capability can provide deterrence 
while it lasts, it also activates the security 
dilemma and any ensuing arms race negates 
the deterrent effect just recently enjoyed.  In 
spite of the Cold War example of unsuccessful 
short term dominance strategies, the United 
States openly advocated steps toward a 
dominance strategy in space with the release 
of the Report of the Commission to Assess 
United States National Security Space 
Management and Organization published in 
2001 (hereafter referred to as the Space 
Commission Report).  While deterrence is 
cited as the goal for space, some of the actions 
called for by the Space Commission Report 
can be interpreted as steps toward a 
dominance strategy.  A possible outcome of 
the military’s pursuit of some of the more 
aggressive goals set out in the Space 
Commission Report is a costly arms race.  
History shows that new offensive capabilities 
are eventually negated by defensive 
countermeasures or countered with greater 
numbers of opposing capabilities.  Once 
begun, arms race momentum is difficult to 
reign in.  In a competitive global environment, 
there is little likelihood that the United States 
can maintain space dominance over the long 
run.  Like the nuclear arms race of the Cold 
War, a space policy seeking deterrence 
through dominance will yield mutual 
vulnerability as the end state.  The key to 
making deterrence under mutual vulnerability 
bearable is to increase transparency in order to 
ease fears and build trust.  For space, this 
requires much better space situational 
awareness (SSA) for all concerned parties.  
Comprehensive and cooperative SSA will 
allow space faring nations to know what is 
actually happening in space instead of 
defaulting to worst case scenario assumptions.  
The best approach to space policy for the long 
run is a cooperative arrangement that accepts 
mutual vulnerability because that’s the 
situation most likely to emerge even after 
great efforts to dominate space are made. 
 
The Cold War 
“WE DO NOT WANT A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE WITH 
THE SOVIET UNION—PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE 
ACTION-REACTION PHENOMENON MAKES IT 
FOOLISH AND FUTILE.”2 
 
The last chapters of the Cold War left an 
impression that nuclear deterrence was finally 
attained after years of effort.  Mutually 
Assured Destruction (MAD) is the nuclear 
deterrent end state that the world became 
familiar with.  It involves living under threat 
of annihilation because of the reserved 
capability to inflict equally unacceptable 
devastation upon the enemy.3  This “delicate 
balance of terror” continues to keep both sides 
in check and is what we have come to know as 
nuclear deterrence.4  This idea of nuclear 
deterrence—deterrence under mutual 
vulnerability—is a strategy that emerged after 
attempts at deterrence through dominance 
failed.  Deterrence through nuclear dominance 
was embraced from the outset as illustrated by 
the U.S. reaction to the Soviets’ first 
successful atomic detonation.  The U.S. 
response was “to raise the nuclear stakes even 
higher by authorizing development of the 
hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb.”5  This 
capability escalation in order to gain, maintain 
or regain an advantage continued throughout 
the Cold War.  The ensuing arms race was 
enormously expensive to both sides and 
neither felt much more secure for the effort. 
                                                
2 Ibid., p. 447. 
3 Fred Iklé, “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century,” 
Foreign Affairs 51, no. 2 (January 1973), p. 268. 
4 Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” 
RAND P-1472, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 6 
November 1958). 
5 Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two Generations of 
Nuclear Strategists,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: from 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 738.  Walter A. 
McDougal, …the Heavens and the Earth (Baltimore: Basic 
Books, 1985), p. 50. 
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Competitiveness and seeking advantage are 
part of human nature.  Nowhere is this more 
evident than in military organizations.  
Military leaders are charged with fighting and 
winning the nation’s wars.  They are 
archetypal advantage seekers, an essential trait 
their fellow citizens demand of them.  It 
should come as no surprise that military 
thinkers advocate dominance strategies.  
There are negative consequences to always 
seeking the advantage, however.  The most 
significant is the “security dilemma” 
(originally “security and power dilemma”) 
which describes a situation where one nation’s 
effort to attain more security, normally 
through armaments, serves to threaten the 
security of another nation.6  The security 
dilemma is the foundation for an arms race—
essentially an action-reaction model.  
“Country A is stimulated by B’s arms 
accumulation, and what A does by way of 
reaction serves as a further stimulus to B….”7  
This can become a never ending cycle when 
resolute adversaries confront one another, 
each apprehensive of the other and determined 
to protect itself.  It seems a logical choice to 
try to attain or maintain an advantage over an 
adversary.  Unfortunately, the very act of 
deterring through military advantages is a 
dominance strategy and practically guarantees 
an arms race when a determined adversary 
exists and has the means to compete.   The 
irony of the security dilemma and subsequent 
arms race is that, despite the incredible effort 
and expense, there is little added security in 
the long run due to the heightened danger 
caused by high levels of armament. 
 
The Cold War illustrates the security dilemma 
and resulting arms race very well.  At the 
                                                
6 John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A 
Study in Theories and Realities, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1951). 
7 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 
Contending Theories of International Relations: A 
Comprehensive Survey, (New York: Longman, 2001),  p. 292. 
close of the Second World War (WWII), the 
United States sought to offset Soviet 
conventional force superiority by using its 
relative advantage, atomic weapons.  The 
Soviet Union, threatened by this, countered 
the U.S. advantage by developing atomic 
weapons of its own.  The U.S. advantage 
eroded under this concerted opposition, so it 
stayed competitive by developing the 
hydrogen bomb.  It did not occur immediately 
to advocates of the hydrogen bomb that an 
arms race would be the result.  The 
thermonuclear bomb was a way to stay in the 
race and hopefully win.8  This is the 
problematic logic of the security dilemma, that 
the next advantage will provide the security 
desired—the fallacy of the last move.  An 
arms race is a short sighted plan to garner 
security through the “immediate benefits that 
temporary superiority might afford.”9  After 
embarking down this path, it proved 
impossible for either to change course.   
 
When there were 100 nuclear warheads, 
deterrence was thought to hold.  When there 
were 1000, the same was true.  At 10,000, 
people probably felt about as safe as they had 
at 100, and yet the sides continued to build to 
more than 30,000.  It is estimated that between 
1945 and 2000, the United States built 70,000 
nuclear warheads and the Soviet Union/Russia 
55,000.10 
 
As the security dilemma predicts, both 
countries increased their capabilities in a cycle 
of action and reaction.  By the end of the Cold 
War both sides had spent an enormous amount 
of money with neither feeling much safer for 
the expense. 
 
                                                
8 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New 
York: Simon & Shuster, 1986), p. 768. 
9 Freedman, “Nuclear Strategists,” p. 739. 
10 Edward Ifft, “Deterrence, Blackmail, Friendly Persuasion,” 
Defense & Security Analysis 23, no. 3, (September 2007), p. 
240. 
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In addition to matching offensive capabilities, 
defensive measures are an important part of 
the competition too.  In an arms race, each 
new offensive capability is offset by defensive 
countermeasures which, in turn, spur the next 
round of offensive capabilities.11  The Cold 
War illustrates this “iron law of weapons 
development” which says that any new 
capability is countered over time with 
technology and procedures to defeat it.12  The 
sword was met with armor and shields.  
German bombers were identified with British 
radar.  Submarines spawned sonar and depth 
charges.  Tanks were attacked with bazookas.  
Radio communications were foiled by 
jammers.  The list is long and the point behind 
it paramount.  Where a determined adversary 
exists, the security dilemma dictates that there 
is seldom more than ephemeral advantages.  
To avert an arms race, a way must be found to 
avoid short term dominance strategies.  The 
Cold War illustrates the intoxicating logic of 
seeking advantage as a way to attain 
deterrence, then embracing as rational the 
arms race and insecurity it produces.   
 
Nuclear policy began to shift from deterrence 
via dominance to deterrence under mutual 
vulnerability with the introduction of 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).  
ICBMs represented, in some ways, the 
culmination of the offense-defense duel.  They 
were a relatively safe offensive weapon due to 
mobility and hardened facilities and nearly 
impossible to defend against because of their 
flight path and speed.13  As a result of these 
characteristics, ICBMs were fielded with the 
knowledge that populations on both sides 
would be vulnerable.14  The nuclear arms race 
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ran its logical course and mutual vulnerability 
was the end result.  With the realization of 
mutual vulnerability came strategies that were 
more purely deterrent in nature.15  This is not 
to say that deterrence wasn’t sought all along.  
It was.  However, much Cold War deterrence 
was sought through advantage or dominance 
strategies, not from positions of equality or 
mutual vulnerability.  Unlike deterrence 
strategies based on some level of dominance, 
the new deterrence introduced by ICBMs 
accepted the reality of the other side’s 
capabilities and sought to manage the situation 
somewhere short of conflict.  Since deterrence 
seeks security through maintaining 
capabilities to dissuade aggressive behavior 
from the other side, the ideal situation is to 
keep that level of military capability at the 
lowest possible level. This reduces overall 
costs and the inherent danger of large weapons 
stockpiles.  The huge buildup of weapons 
during the Cold War illustrates that the longer 
it takes to transition from deterrence via 
dominance to deterrence accepting mutual 
vulnerability, the more costly and potentially 
dangerous the arms race. 
 
Arresting the momentum of the arms race 
during the Cold War was difficult to do.  
Greater transparency was essential to disrupt 
the cycle of fear.  This was because military 
leaders’ desire for more weapons was often 
motivated by the unknown capabilities of their 
adversary.  Military leaders must plan for the 
worst case scenario.  Lack of real knowledge 
of Soviet capabilities led to more U.S. weapon 
acquisitions that fueled the “mad momentum” 
of the arms race.16  The Cold War saw bomber 
gaps, missile gaps and every other conceivable 
capabilities gap which required more weapons 
to fill.  Closing all of these perceived gaps 
gave momentum to the arms race until, after 
significant effort and great expense, “both 
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sides gradually came to understand that 
transparency…could improve their security.”17  
Transparency permitted planning for real 
threats, not imagined ones, and allowed the 
upward trajectory of the arms race to finally 
subside.  Arms control agreements were 
negotiated and verification procedures 
provided the necessary transparency to 
gradually ease fears.  The end result was a 
way out of the arms race with transparency 
making the uncomfortable feeling of mutual 
vulnerability a bit more bearable. 
 
This is a narrow review of just some of the 
dynamics of the Cold War that are applicable 
to future space policy.  It is not intended as a 
complete analysis of the myriad dynamics of 
Cold War strategy, policy or decision making.  
It is clear, however, that in spite of difficult 
debates and agonizing decisions over Cold 
War military strategy, both the United States 
and former Soviet Union did, in fact, develop 
nuclear weapons in the tens of thousands only 
to work toward their destruction after the Cold 
War thawed.18  Space policy practitioners can 
learn some lessons from Cold War deterrence 
practices.  First, deterrence through 
dominance (advantage seeking) is a short term 
strategy if a capable and determined adversary 
exists.  The long term situation will be 
deterrence under mutual vulnerability and 
acceptance of other nations’ capabilities.  
Second, policy makers should recall that the 
security dilemma, once activated, can lead to 
an arms race which is very difficult to reign 
in.  Finally, transparency is required to 
assuage fears, whether to prevent an arms race 
or to end one. These lessons are important to 
remember because the United States indebted 
future generations with the cost of “winning” 
                                                
17 William C. Martel and Toshi Yoshihara, “Averting a Sino-
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2003), p. 28. 
18 Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Global Nuclear 
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(July/August 2006), pp. 64-66. 
the Cold War and the Soviet Union ceased to 
be.   
 
The Space Commission Report 
 
“BUT WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT IT IS 
MONEY SPENT BECAUSE OF THE ACTION-
REACTION PHENOMENON.”19 
 
Fear of losing a vital capability can drive the 
security dilemma in the same way as fear of 
another’s capabilities.  Relative capabilities 
and advantages matter most for security 
concerns since one nation’s strengths are 
important mostly as compared to the strengths 
of others.  The United States publicly 
announced fear of a “Space Pearl Harbor” in 
the Space Commission Report.20  This fear has 
some parallels to the situation at the close of 
WWII.  Then, as now, the United States 
actually had the advantage.  The fear then, as 
now, was of losing it.  The perceived threat to 
U.S. space dominance spurred the United 
States to action.  According to the Union of 
Concerned Scientists database, as of 1 January 
2010 there were 926 satellites in orbit.  Of 
those, 422 were solely U.S. satellites with 
another 20 having the United States as a 
cooperating partner.  This means the United 
States operates solely, or has a stake in, 48 
percent of all satellites in orbit.21  In spite of 
this substantial numerical advantage, the 
commission expressed concern.  This concern 
is founded on one belief in particular.  “We 
know from history that every medium—air, 
land, and sea—has seen conflict; reality 
indicates that space will be no different.”22  
This logic is similar to the logic that led to the 
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Cold War arms race.  The United States 
expected the former Soviet Union to advance 
conflict in every way possible, and the Soviets 
expected the same.  Due largely to this 
pessimistic and uncooperative view of human 
nature, both nations’ fears were realized in the 
arms race that followed.  While the 
commission’s assessment of conflict in every 
medium is accurate, history reveals another 
important factor that the commission did not 
address.  To borrow from the commission’s 
statement about history: we know from history 
that every military capability—whether in air, 
land, or sea—has seen countermeasures; 
reality indicates that space will be no 
different.  This is also an “iron law” from 
history and warns of an arms race to follow if 
determined opposition exists.23  Policy makers 
must deal with both these realities or risk 
activating the security dilemma. 
 
The foundational beliefs of the 2001 Space 
Commission Report were incorporated into 
the 2006 National Space Policy.  The 
commission’s recommendations set the stage 
for a more assertive space policy.  The 
specific language of the 2006 National Space 
Policy that received a great deal of attention is 
that of denying space capabilities to potential 
adversaries.  Joan Johnson-Freese writes that 
“although the words ‘space weapons’ are 
never uttered, they can be heard if one listens 
closely.”24  The assumption is that denying a 
space capability to an adversary will require 
some type of space weapon, something the 
Space Commission Report advocates 
outright.25  Whether or not the policy explicitly 
calls for weapons in space, its tone promotes 
the image of space superiority.  The second 
paragraph of the policy states that “those who 
effectively utilize space…will hold a 
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substantial advantage over those who do 
not.”26  This is the language of competition 
and dominance like that of the early Cold 
War.  An arms race in space could emerge if a 
determined adversary with the means to 
compete chooses to do so.  
 
An alternative to the aggressive approach 
suggested in these two documents seems 
unlikely to come from military leadership.  
The military is charged with ensuring that if 
the nation “calls its sons and daughters to 
arms…that they have every advantage in the 
field so that they prevail.”27  Gaining and 
maintaining capability advantages is what the 
military does.  Space will be no different. 
 
Indeed, three months after the release of the 
Space Commission’s report, General Eberhart 
indicated that Air Force Space Command had 
supported the commission’s recommendations 
“in every respect.”  He also noted that the Air 
Force chief of staff, General Ryan, had moved 
promptly to cut off any nonconcurring groups 
within the Air Force to telegraph clearly that 
the Air Force had accepted the commission’s 
recommendations in principle and was now 
deep in the process of trying to determine how 
best to comply with them.28 
 
A survey of 75 space professionals attending 
classes at the National Security Space Institute 
(NSSI) in March 2010 confirms that the 
military has internalized the space 
commission’s assessment.  Of those surveyed, 
92 percent believe that space will see conflict, 
with 81 percent identifying China as the 
primary competitor.  An almost unanimous 97 
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percent believe the United States should 
attempt to maintain its current advantage in 
space.29   These views represent space 
professionals dedicated to a dominance 
strategy in space.  This was the approach 
followed at the start of the Cold War as well—
trying to stay ahead.  Predicting what lies 
ahead, 69 percent of those surveyed also think 
an arms race in space is likely.30  In light of 
the near unanimous call to maintain U.S. 
advantages in space, this indicates that the 
current group of space professionals has 
embraced the concept of an arms race to stay 
ahead—space dominance. 
 
There is a time to engage in an arms race, but 
that time is not now.  Participating in an arms 
race makes sense if an adversary builds 
military capabilities that represent an 
existential threat to national survival.  During 
the Cold War, both the United States and the 
former Soviet Union built nuclear arsenals 
that could almost completely destroy the 
other.  Faced with the threat of destruction, it 
did make sense for both sides to offset the 
capabilities of the other.  The faulty logic was 
in endlessly pursuing dominance rather than 
accepting deterrence and the mutual 
vulnerability it implied.  Neither the United 
States nor the former Soviet Union was 
satisfied to stop the arms race unless they 
were in the lead.  This focus on short term 
advantage even when long term mutual 
vulnerability was evident is why the arms race 
took on such a “mad momentum.”31  All this 
effort was ultimately unnecessary since the 
condition of mutual vulnerability, once 
established, did not change throughout the 
Cold War.  It is the condition that remains 
today.  To some extent, the problem early in 
the Cold War was unmitigated fear of the 
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30 Ibid. 
31 MacNamara, “The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy,” p. 450. 
unknown.  Lack of real knowledge about 
Soviet capabilities and intentions certainly 
motivated the United States to participate in 
the arms race.  After all, national survival was 
at stake.  Soviet apprehension about the 
United States motivated them in the same 
way.  
 
Representative of the military dominance 
approach to space, Everett C. Dolman, 
professor at the Air Force’s School of 
Advanced Air and Space Studies, writes that 
“the United States should seize control of 
outer space and become the shepherd (or 
perhaps watchdog) for all who would venture 
there, for if any one state must do it, it is the 
most likely to establish a benign hegemony.”32  
The rest of the world seems not to agree with 
this assessment of the United States as an 
unthreatening power.  The European Union is 
developing its own version of the Global 
Positioning System (GPS), called Galileo, 
illustrating its doubt about the enduring 
benevolence of the United States.33  Russia 
and China are developing and improving their 
own space based navigation systems as well.  
This in spite of U.S. assurances that the GPS 
signal would never be denied to worldwide 
users.  China feels that “the United States’ 
self-appointed guardianship of space is 
presumptuous and represents a genuine 
challenge to China’s national security 
concerns.”34  Rather than speak with words 
that the United States might not hear, China 
demonstrated an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon 
in January 2007, destroying one of its own 
satellites in a possible “shot across the bow of 
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U.S. military power.”35  Uncontested 
hegemony in space is as unlikely as earlier 
attempts at nuclear hegemony—opposition is 
evident. 
 
Mutual Vulnerability 
 
“FOR IT IS A PROFITLESS WASTE OF RESOURCES, 
PROVIDED WE AND THE SOVIETS CAN COME TO A 
REALISTIC STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION 
AGREEMENT.”36 
 
The long term end state in space will be 
deterrence under mutual vulnerability, as with 
nuclear weapons before.  In a competitive 
strategic environment, there are essentially 
three alternatives to this end state over the 
long run.  The United States could fight a 
preventive war to eliminate an adversary’s 
space capabilities so they cannot threaten U.S. 
space assets.  Absent war, a unique situation 
could arise where no competitor emerges to 
challenge U.S. dominance in space—a forfeit 
win.  The final alternative is to compete in an 
arms race and win, maintaining the dominance 
sought.  An examination of each alternative 
reveals that, for a variety of reasons, mutual 
vulnerability will be the long term end state. 
 
Preventive war is striking a country without 
provocation for the purpose of maintaining a 
power advantage.  This is the most violent 
side of dominance strategies where it is 
deemed acceptable to wage war rather than 
accept a potential threat sometime in the 
future.  Preventive war is something that 
liberal democracies are averse to do since 
justification for it usually fails to cross the 
political and moral imperative thresholds.  
China is the country most often mentioned as 
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the next potential threat to the United States.  
Absent a state of hostilities, it is difficult to 
imagine U.S. civilian decision-makers 
authorizing a U.S. first strike on China for the 
morally indefensible goal of staying in the 
lead in space.  China and the United States are 
also intimately connected through trade and 
financial transactions, with China holding a 
large stake in U.S. debt.  This, and the fact 
that the American people are unlikely to 
tolerate a preventive conflict to stay ahead in 
space, makes preventive war highly 
improbable. 
 
Another alternative to mutual vulnerability is 
the fortuitous situation where no adversary 
emerges to challenge U.S. space dominance.  
This thinking often accompanies dominance 
strategies.  It suggests that U.S. space 
capabilities will not be challenged due to the 
enormous effort required to catch up.  As 
previously discussed, the former Soviet 
Union’s actions early in the Cold War when 
its atomic detonation ended the U.S. nuclear 
monopoly undermine this kind of thinking.  
An unchallenged position in space today is as 
unlikely as an unchallenged position in 
nuclear arms was after WWII.  China, Russia, 
and the EU have signaled various degrees of 
dissatisfaction with unchecked U.S. 
dominance and, if history is a guide, that 
position will not go uncontested over the long 
run.     
 
The final alternative to mutual vulnerability in 
space is to engage in, and win, a space arms 
race.  Winning an arms race means the U.S 
.maintains space dominance and does not have 
to accept mutual vulnerability as the end state.  
Winning is not just participating in an arms 
race and surviving.  Winning means attaining 
the goal—dominance.  If mutual vulnerability 
lies at the end of the arms race then nothing 
has been won.   
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The Cold War illustrates that true deterrence is 
a strategy that accepts mutual vulnerability, 
not dominance.  It is certainly true that 
dominant military capabilities have a profound 
deterrent effect while they last.  But deterrence 
based on dominance is fleeting.  A stable 
deterrent end state is based on mutual 
vulnerability after the competition subsides.  
However, mutual vulnerability doesn’t mean 
defenseless.  Nor is it a position of weakness.  
It is simply the condition that emerges when 
neither side can dominate the other, but each 
maintains a capacity to inflict harm.  This 
concept of mutually vulnerable deterrence 
already applies to space.  Satellites are 
practically the definition of vulnerable, flying 
predictable orbits with few defenses.  Due to 
this orbit predictability, lack of defenses and 
an inadequate space object identification and 
characterization capability, the offense has the 
advantage over the defense in space such that 
taking out a satellite is relatively much less 
difficult than defending one.37  This means that 
mutual vulnerability is the condition that 
exists in space today.  Combined with the 
knowledge of ready space competitors and 
demonstrated countermeasures, the likely end 
state is clear.  Deterrence based on mutual 
vulnerability, not dominance, is the future of 
space. 
 
An important step toward making deterrence 
under mutual vulnerability politically and 
militarily tolerable is to increase transparency.  
Cooperation between space faring nations will 
require agreed upon procedures that establish 
the transparency necessary to solidify trust.38  
Verification of the conditions of an agreement 
serves to lower tensions in a de-escalating 
cycle opposite that of the escalating cycle of 
the security dilemma.  As the dominant space 
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power, increasing transparency will pose 
difficulties for the United States.  A 
verification study conducted by the 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense 
Studies points out that “[i]ncreasing the 
openness of space operations…involves 
inequity for the United States.  Because we 
can see more and see further, others stand to 
gain more in the short run than we do.  A 
political judgment will be needed as to 
whether the long term gain in stability and 
predictability outweighs this short term, 
relative disadvantage.”39  As discussed so far, 
the Cold War example strongly suggests that 
long term stability is preferable to short term 
advantage.  When the United States feared the 
unknown nuclear capabilities of the former 
Soviet Union during the Cold War, the 
introduction of reconnaissance satellites 
helped lower anxiety levels.  Real information 
was far more useful than the imagined worst 
case scenarios in military planners’ minds.  
Once arms control agreements where 
negotiated and in place, transparency made 
them bearable and helped them stick. 
 
U.S. de facto dominance in space means that 
the United States has the most to lose there.  
In order to keep an arms race at bay, the 
United States needs to improve its information 
about what is happening in space in an 
accurate and timely manner.  Like 
reconnaissance satellites during the Cold War, 
better SSA can provide real information and 
alleviate tension.  SSA is the ability to assess 
the big picture in space through detection, 
characterization and tracking.  It is who, what, 
where, and why for all things in space.  But 
the capability to accomplish this in a timely 
manner at the level of fidelity required for 
accurate characterization of both capability 
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and intent does not currently exist.40  As Dr. 
David Finkleman points out, “the United 
States Air Force Space Surveillance Network 
(SSN) cannot gather data sufficient for 
complete collision avoidance” of objects in 
space.41  In light of the vital nature of space 
assets to U.S. national security, this 
knowledge gap serves to aggravate U.S. fears 
and gives credence to calls for dominance 
strategies.  One step toward improving SSA 
could be the incorporation of “Persistent 
Technical Means for ground-based space 
situational awareness.”42  This method would 
employ the many civil and commercial means 
of space surveillance already in place, 
providing more timely and accurate SSA than 
is possible utilizing just the Air Force Space 
Surveillance Network (SSN).  One unique 
benefit of this approach, from a cooperative 
legal framework perspective, is that “[n]o 
single authority or stakeholder could prevent 
the collective perception.”43  In other words, a 
degree of transparency is implied in the 
collaborative process itself, partially relieving 
the problem of trusting no verification means 
but your own.  This approach has the added 
benefit of including those with the least 
technical means in cooperative arrangements 
since they can attain the information required 
for verification from outside resources.  
However it evolves, an improved, reliable and 
comprehensive SSA capability is a critical 
step toward accepting the relative security of 
deterrence within a legal framework of 
verifiable mutual vulnerability.   
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“WHAT MADE WAR INEVITABLE WAS THE GROWTH 
OF ATHENIAN POWER AND THE FEAR WHICH THIS 
CAUSED IN SPARTA.”44 
 
The Cold War illustrates how nuclear 
deterrence under mutual vulnerability 
emerged after deterrence through dominance, 
pursued by both sides, failed.  Faced with a 
determined adversary, there are only short 
term advantages.  The security dilemma 
guarantees a response by the other side and 
the action-reaction cycle ensures that neither 
gains any lasting security.  The Cold War 
experience shows that, in spite of enormous 
effort and expense, two competitors can 
remain nearly as vulnerable in the end as 
when they started.  There was evidence early 
in the Cold War that the long term reality 
would not be dominance for either side, but 
rather managed cooperation due to the de 
facto condition of mutual vulnerability.  The 
same will likely be true of space.  Space assets 
are vulnerable today and will remain so in 
spite of all the effort and money the United 
States can muster.  The difference now is that 
the United States can work to implement that 
long term reality before spending large 
amounts of money trying to ward off the 
inevitable vulnerability.  There is an 
opportunity to avoid a space arms race 
entirely.  In light of the current financial 
troubles in the United States and elsewhere, it 
is in the United States best interests that an 
arms competition in space never occurs. 
 
The latest National Space Policy published by 
the Obama administration in June 2010 is a 
small step in the right direction.  It uses more 
cooperative language than the previous space 
policy and avoids the dominance rhetoric, but 
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does not go far enough.45  The next iteration 
should include specific steps required to move 
toward long term cooperation with a workable 
verification regime.  Political leadership from 
the highest levels is required both to guide 
military efforts and to garner international 
cooperation and commitment.  The effort will 
not be easy, but it’s much better to do it now 
than to wait for a space arms race to put a 
further drain on national coffers. 
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